Russia routinely assails Ukraine with hordes of Iranian-derived kamikaze drones, big hypersonic ballistic missiles, and subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles released by hulking strategic bombers. But social media posts on May 10 show Ukraine’s GUR military intelligence agency has a smaller new threat on its mind: a medium-range cruise missile called S8000 Banderol that is small enough to be launched by Russian attack helicopters and Orion combat drones.
“Banderol” was recently shown to Medvedev at Kapustin Yar. https://t.co/1XB4l6MTWy pic.twitter.com/oFaDK8PIEP
— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) May 12, 2025
The new Russian weapon sits astride two narratives. GUR officials emphasize that the missile is yet another example of a Russian weapon assembled from a patchwork of Chinese and Western components. At least some of the latter could be curbed by smarter sanctions.
But the Banderol also reflects a larger global trend of seeking dramatically cheaper means to deliver precision strikes at long distances. Combatants are seeking lighter weapons that can be mounted on smaller, cheaper platforms that otherwise lack standoff attack capabilities.
Banderol by the numbers
Banderol (meaning “Package” or “Parcel”) was first photographed at Russia’s Kapustin Yar training ground in 2024. It has evidently been used in combat, since the GUR was able to recover and study a spent round. Ukrainian sources speculate Banderols may have been launched against Odessa and Mykolaiv in southern Ukraine in February. Russia showcased the weapon without naming it when one was shown to President Dmitry Medvedev on April 26 during a visit to Kapustin Yar.
The five-meter-long missile has a fuselage 300 millimeters in diameter—roughly a foot—with a form factor similar to the U.S.’ stealthy JASSM cruise missile. It purportedly has a strike range of 310 miles (this is likely an inexact figure), a cruising speed of 350 miles per hour, and a maximum attack speed of 385-400 miles per hour, while carrying a 253-pound high explosive/fragmentation warhead.
The range, speed, and warhead aren’t impressive compared to traditional cruise missiles, but they’re good enough for Russia’s needs, allowing release by Orion drones from outside the range of Ukrainian air defenses. Meanwhile, the speed poses substantially greater interception and early-warning problems compared to other kamikaze drones.
For now the only navigation methods indicated for the Banderol are a combination of inertial navigation and a jam-resistant Kometa-8M satellite navigation antenna, meaning it’s suitable only for attacks against predesignated static targets.
The GUR also claims the Banderol can execute much tighter turns than traditional Russian cruise missiles, without specifying how or why. Such tight maneuvers seem useful mainly for executing evasive maneuvers. This would imply the existence of a warning system to trigger those maneuvers when coming under attack; pre-programming of maneuvers during the terminal phase; or ability to receive evasion instructions remotely.
Russia’s multi-national mini-cruise missile
The GUR is keen to highlight that the Banderol is a patchwork of civilian-grade components from 30 different international companies. It reportedly uses a Chinese Swiwin SW800Pro-A95 turbojet for propulsion. This device has an 8-inch diameter and can be purchased online for $16,000.
Its inertial navigation system is also Chinese, while its RFD900X telemetry module is of Australian origin, and its Murata batteries come from Japan. It also has South Korean MX-64AR servos and U.S.A.-sourced RF power amplifiers. Microchips in the aircraft are sourced from the aforementioned countries, as well as Switzerland.
This patchwork reflects both Russia’s inability to domestically produce many common components, but also its ever-evolving ability to source dual-use parts abroad through a network of third-party middlemen.
Reportedly, Banderol parts have particularly been sourced via Russia’s ChipDip electronics retailer, which confoundingly hasn’t been widely sanctioned outside of the U.S. and Ukraine.
Why drones and helicopters need longer-range missiles
The Banderol is yet another example of a new genre of precision weapons specifically designed for launch by drones, which generally have significantly lower payload thresholds than manned platforms.
Specifically, it’s intended for slinging under the fuselage of a Kronstadt Orion drone, a medium-altitude combat drone akin to America’s retired MQ-1 Predator and Turkey’s TB2 Bayraktar.
While Ukraine’s Bayraktars and Russia’s Orions had a brief heyday early in the war, both types rapidly became scarce on the frontline once integrated air-defense systems were belatedly deployed. Slow and not highly stealthy, for their multi-million dollar costs UCAVs broadly are just too vulnerable to enemies with medium-altitude air defenses—a problem also afflicting much pricier MQ-9 drones deployed by the U.S. against Houthi rebels.
While Russia has gotten some effective use of Orions in places Ukraine couldn’t deploy air defenses, they generally have played a limited support role compared to cheaper Orlan and Zala surveillance and reconnaissance drones, and single-use Lancet and Shahed/Geran kamikaze drones.
The Banderol, therefore, enables Russia’s Orion fleet to sustainably contribute to Russia’s strategic strike campaign, or to its operational-depth strikes, with little risk of loss. Compared to ground-launched Shahed drones with jet engines, air-launched Banderols can be released closer and from more unpredictable angles (for example, from over the Black Sea).
Russia’s interest in integrating Banderols for launch from the two stub wings of Mi-28N Havoc helicopters stems from similar issues to those affecting UCAVs: attack helicopters, conceived as launch platforms for direct-fire anti-tank missiles, are struggling to survive against modern short-range air defense. Thus longer-range indirect-fire weapons that deny the enemy a chance to shoot back are increasingly preferred, whether that be Russia’s LMUR anti-tank missile or the Israeli Spike missiles being integrated into U.S. Apaches to fulfill a long-range precision-fire requirement.
The Banderol undoubtedly also reflects Russia’s—and indeed, the world’s—growing demand for a new generation of much cheaper cruise missiles suitable for lengthy wars of attrition—80% solutions ideally built for less than half the price. The realization that existing stocks of guided weapons could be used up in a few weeks of high-intensity warfare has spurred a multitude of Pentagon programs seeking much cheaper, rapidly mass-produced munitions drawing on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts.
Kronstadt’s extensive use of foreign COTS parts in the Banderol reflects such a cost-minimization strategy—although we don’t yet know the unit price or monthly production rate for this munition.
Understandably, Ukraine’s defenders aren’t thrilled that Russia is exploring new ways to launch smaller, likely cheaper cruise missiles as a medium-solution between its heavier, costly cruise and ballistic missiles, and its cheap but very slow kamikaze drones.
About the Author:
Sebastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including the 19FortyFive, The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com, and War is Boring. He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China.
