Summary and Key Points – The USS Florida (SSGN-728) recently completed a historic 727-day deployment, circumnavigating the globe and traveling 60,000 nautical miles while swapping crews five times.
-Armed with up to 154 Tomahawk missiles, the converted guided-missile submarine serves as a critical stealth deterrent, yet it is slated for decommissioning in 2026 along with the USS Ohio.
-Analysts warn that retiring these heavily used platforms without a direct replacement creates a dangerous “conventional strike gap,” removing hundreds of missile tubes from the fleet just as tensions in the Indo-Pacific rise.
727 Days at Sea: Inside the USS Florida’s ‘Record-Breaking’ 60,000-Mile Global Patrol
The USS Florida completed a 727-day deployment, one of the longest submarine patrols in modern US Navy history.
The submarine operated across the Middle East, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific—circumnavigating the globe, sailing 60,000 nautical miles and swapping crews five times.
The whole time, USS Florida was armed with Tomahawk missiles, designed for real-world strike missions.
Yet, despite the world tour, Florida is slated for decommission, which raises a slate of questions: why retire a platform the Navy is still relying so heavily on?
Alternatively, if the Navy is not relying on the platform so heavily, why send her on a 60,000-mile jaunt?

Ohio-Class SSBN. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Ohio-Class SSGN. Image Credit: U.S. Navy.
Deep Dive: The USS Florida Ohio-Class SSGN U.S. Navy Submarine
Originally built as an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the USS Florida was converted in the mid-2000s into an SSGN (guided-missile submarine).
The key distinction in the transition: nuclear ballistic missiles were removed while conventional strike capacity was amplified. SSGNs function as stealthy strike platforms, serving as special operations support hubs, providing a persistent presence.
Each Ohio SSGN can carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, meaning that few platforms in the world combine that degree of range, payload, survivability, and strategic ambiguity.
The SSGN Conversion
The SSGN conversion reflected the realities of the post-Cold War era. After arms reduction treaties, the US had an excess of SSBNs, which were not only treaty-restricted but strategically overkill. The SSGN conversion was a cost-effective adaptation, not a luxury move.
It has the US Navy’s immediate deep-strike capability, enabling it to strike on Day One of a conflict. The concept was tested in Libya in 2011, when USS Florida alone fired over 90 Tomahawks.
Over time, the SSGN quietly became the Navy’s most reliable opening-move asset, a deterrent that didn’t require escalation to nuclear use.
727 Days at Sea
The Florida’s deployment began in August 2022 amid the war in Ukraine, rising China-Taiwan tensions, and nagging concern over Iran.
USS Florida was tasked with operating continuously across oceans, persistently. Limited only by crew endurance, the crew was swapped five times, allowing the Florida to persist and persist.
The long-term tour signaled that the US could surge firepower anywhere and had the endurance to sustain prolonged great-power competition.

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Wash. (Aug. 14, 2003) — USS Ohio (SSGN 726) is in dry dock undergoing a conversion from a Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) to a Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN) designation. Ohio has been out of service since Oct. 29, 2002 for conversion to SSGN at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Four Ohio-class strategic missile submarines, USS Ohio (SSBN 726), USS Michigan (SSBN 727) USS Florida (SSBN 728), and USS Georgia (SSBN 729) have been selected for transformation into a new platform, designated SSGN. The SSGNs will have the capability to support and launch up to 154 Tomahawk missiles, a significant increase in capacity compared to other platforms. The 22 missile tubes also will provide the capability to carry other payloads, such as unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Special Forces equipment. This new platform will also have the capability to carry and support more than 66 Navy SEALs (Sea, Air and Land) and insert them clandestinely into potential conflict areas. U.S. Navy file photo. (RELEASED)

Artist’s concept of an Ohio-class SSGN launching Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles.

Ohio-class submarine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The deployment of an East Coast-based submarine into the Pacific was unusual, though intentional; the mission was less about combat and more about deterrence, presence, and readiness.
It was about sending a message to China, but it was not just symbolism; it was operational proof that SSGNs are still a conventional anchor platform.
Hard to Replace
The SSGN will be hard to replace—they offer stealth that no surface vessel can rival, and missile capacity that no other single platform can rival.
Unlike surface combatants, SSGNs are challenging to track and can be deployed without the political baggage or the risk of escalation. Unlike aircraft, SSGNs are persistent and not dependent on basing or carrier access.
In a crisis, an SSGN offshore complicates enemy planning—which is why SSGNs are so ideal for opening strikes, suppression of air defenses (SEAD), and holding high-value targets at risk.
Strategic Implications
Both the USS Florida and the USS Ohio are slated for retirement in 2026. No direct replacement exists. The Columbia-class submarine replaces SSBNs—not SSGNs—and is behind schedule and over budget.
Retiring SSGNs removes hundreds of Tomahawk launch cells from the fleet; that firepower does not automatically reappear elsewhere, meaning the Navy risks a conventional strike gap and reduced surge capacity in early conflict phases.

Ohio-class SSGN. Image Credit: US Military.
In the Indo-Pacific, specifically, losing the SSGN means fewer stealthy options and more reliance on exposed surface forces.
Great-power competition, on the rise, favors persistence, ambiguity, and a forward presence. USS Florida’s deployment shows that the Navy still values all three. But retiring the platform anyway suggests that budget pressures are driving strategic decisions, rather than the more desirable inverse: strategy driving force structure.
The SSGN may be aging, but it is not yet entirely obsolete. The risk in retirement is offloading capabilities faster than replacements can arrive.
On the other hand, the US defense budget is pushing one trillion dollars—far and away the highest in human history.
Choices will need to be paid; concessions will need to be made.
Specific capabilities will need to be sacrificed.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is an attorney and journalist covering national security, technology, and politics. Previously, he was a political staffer and candidate, and a US Air Force pilot selectee. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in global journalism and international relations from NYU.