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Dr. James Holmes: The Naval Diplomat - 19FortyFive

The U.S. Military’s Great Relearning

Last week the amphibian pundit CDR Salamander had some tart words for Joint Chiefs chairman Mark Milley. General Milley recently held forth on the Ukraine war, maintaining that “a big lesson learned” from the Russian invasion is “the incredible consumption rates of conventional munitions” even in a limited regional conflagration. A war in Korea or the Taiwan Strait would consume far more. A major war means a major expenditure of ordnance. Who’d’ve thought?

120322-M-PH863-005 U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Leobardo Nunez provides security during a census patrol through a village near Khan Neshin, Afghanistan, on March 22, 2012. Nunez is an infantry automatic rifleman assigned to Alpha Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. DoD photo by Cpl. Alfred V. Lopez, U.S. Air Force. (Released)

Last week the amphibian pundit CDR Salamander had some tart words for Joint Chiefs chairman Mark Milley. General Milley recently held forth on the Ukraine war, maintaining that “a big lesson learned” from the Russian invasion is “the incredible consumption rates of conventional munitions” even in a limited regional conflagration. A war in Korea or the Taiwan Strait would consume far more.

A major war means a major expenditure of ordnance. Who’d’ve thought?

Sal traces this “gobsmacking” statement from America’s top-ranking uniformed military officer to faulty wargaming, and there’s doubtless truth to that. Any system of logic is founded on assumptions that can be neither proved nor disproved within the system. They’re taken as self-evident, much like the “givens” from which students try to work proofs in grade-school algebra or geometry.

Assumptions are powerful things. If they’re deeply flawed, a game based on them tends to produce results incongruent with reality. Garbage in, garbage out.

But I think it’s worth revisiting some larger candidate explanations for the Pentagon’s evident obtuseness toward the need to have a sizable armory of munitions on hand should a major regional war break out. One is philosophical. It comes from novelist Tom Wolfe, who wrote an amusing piece titled “The Great Relearning” in 1987. Wolfe recounted walking around San Francisco’s Haight-Ashbury district in 1968, while the Sixties were in full swing, complete with hippies propounding all manner of novel doctrines about politics, society, and life.

In fact, reported Wolfe, denizens of Haight-Ashbury had decided they had nothing to learn from millennia of human history and traditions. For them it was Year Zero, when the enlightened would shake off the dead hand of the past and build a brave new world from scratch. And they were serious! To the extent that they forwent such commonsense practices as basic hygiene. Modern San Francisco saw the reappearance of sicknesses not seen for decades or more. Deliberate forgetfulness will do that to you.

It turned out that oldtimers weren’t that benighted after all. Hippies had to undertake a Great Relearning, reacquainting themselves with the storehouse of knowledge passed down from generation to generation. Common sense—the highest form of wisdom for thinkers like Aristotle—had to make a comeback.

The U.S. military isn’t a bunch of smelly hippies, but it is undergoing a Great Relearning of its own. Its Year Zero was 1991-1992, when the Soviet Union folded up shop and Washington started casting about for a post-Cold War strategy. The nation and the armed forces convinced themselves that the end of military history was nigh, with the main adversary gone and no new one on the horizon. U.S. Navy leaders instructed the sea service to reinvent itself as a “fundamentally different naval service” that had little need to fight a peer enemy that—naval history having ended—would never appear on the high seas.

Until one did.

In short, the armed forces are relearning timeless verities such as: your magazines need to be full of ordnance in case a fight comes along; regenerating combat power demands a vibrant industrial base at home; logistics matters, and any competent foe will menace U.S. resupply routes; and, most elementally, there will always be a next challenger for regional or world supremacy. Welcome and enjoy an interregnum after a successful competition, but never kid yourself. The next big thing is coming sooner or later, so it’s better to stay in a competitive frame of mind rather than be compelled to rediscover old truths in the midst of a fresh struggle, when it might be too late.

But end-of-history thinking alone can’t account for America’s post-Cold War myopia. Armed services were undergoing a change from depending mainly on gunfire to depending mainly on missiles by the late Cold War. Unlike World War II, when industry could mass-produce untold quantities of low-tech armaments in short order, it takes time to manufacture high-tech precision arms, not to mention the heavy expense to purchase even a single round. Keeping the magazine full, in other words, is a different problem than in relatively low-tech ages of yore. That technological changeover, coupled with the perceived diminished need for military might, generated a vicious cycle in which budgeteers applied constant downward pressure on the inventory of weaponry needed to battle a peer antagonist. The post-9/11 brushfire wars only distorted U.S. martial priorities further.

Confucius had his Great Learning; the Sixties generation suffered through its Great Relearning. From now on let’s take our martial philosophy more from ancient China than 1960s San Francisco.

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

Written By

James Holmes holds the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface-warfare officer, he was the last gunnery officer in history to fire a battleship’s big guns in anger, during the first Gulf War in 1991. He earned the Naval War College Foundation Award in 1994, signifying the top graduate in his class. His books include Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010 and a fixture on the Navy Professional Reading List. General James Mattis deems him “troublesome.”



  1. Johhny Ray

    April 2, 2023 at 7:44 pm

    Seems to me having means to quickly ramp up production is more important than stockpiling weapons and ammunition. Today’s best stuff may become outdated or require high resources to store and maintain regardless.

    As an aside, the cost of the Ukraine War to the west is in reality much less than it seems since much of the weaponry and munitions going east is out dated, almost war surplus quality, products that may be close to dysfunction or disposal.

    Last but not least, it’s been a very, very long time since the world has seen a war of this intensity. Maintaining knife edge sharp war readiness is difficult over multi-decades.

    Regardless, I do agree stockpiling weapons and ammo is a major issue, but it’s also a nuanced issue.

  2. Ben Leucking

    April 2, 2023 at 9:24 pm

    Excellent observations.
    The US Military, DOD and Congress hung out a ‘Gone Fishing’ sign and China noticed.

  3. jbelkin

    April 2, 2023 at 9:59 pm

    We should just use Amazon to store them, they seem to get anything anywhere in hours or 2 days …

  4. 404NotFound

    April 2, 2023 at 10:19 pm

    US military is the pole uncle Sam uses to poke at every door he comes across.

    That would have been okay in the 19th & early 20th centuries BUT NOT TODAY.

    Unfortunately, US democrat presidents, their national security advisers and their generals and admirals don’t understand that at all.

    LBJ in nam, Carter in Afghanistan, Clinton in Iraq, Obama in Yemen & Libya and today, Biden in Ukraine. Tomorrow, Harris in taiwan ???

    Other peoples’ problems or possessions can’t or shouldn’t be solved by using the military abroad to overrule them.

    That method was employed by the european colonial powers, great terra nullius explorers, unrivalled militarists like hitler, Tojo, Mussolini and leMay.

    Today, you employ the method called negotiating at the negotiation table.

    Unless you intend to end things out by using only thermo struggle which is what Biden of USA wokeism new policy is doing or pursuing.

  5. NorEastern

    April 3, 2023 at 8:19 am

    It is absurd to think that the US military will ever be involved again in WWI style trench warfare. This topic requires zero discussion.

  6. Jim

    April 3, 2023 at 9:47 am

    Not having a “continental” sized war for over 30 years & seemingly not having a peer-competitor on the horizon (at least that’s how it appeared in the ’90s) will effect war stockpiles… (it does seem we did relatively well with regard to R & D).

    The U. S. also made a choice: instead of Peace & Prosperity, geopolitical policies… we engaged in Domination policies (many countries silently recognized what was going on and resented it, some more intensely than others… and quietly maneuvered and prepared for a time of defiance against the U. S.)

    The U. S. as the top Nation-State… who had a good thing going… should have been concerned with keeping the peace… in a world system working well for us… Dollar as World Reserve Currency… economic relations favorable to us.

    But that wasn’t good enough… they weren’t satisfied.

    Frankly, there was a sense nobody could touch us… we could do what we wanted… with little risk of full-on Continental sized war… with its material & logistics requirements.

    I think the above sentiment is the major reason for why we find ourselves where we are regarding military supplies.

    Ukraine is not a continental sized war… yet, it has stretched our military stockpiles… it was never supposed to last more than a month… Russia was supposed to “freeze up” economically from “shock & awe” sanctions, which in turn would have “dried up” the military and fractured any political consensus in Russia.

    So, yes, assumptions play a key role in deciding force structure, quantity and quality of military equipment necessary to “be on hand” at any given moment.

    Sadly, our geopolitical actions have provoked a whole series of reactions from various countries… each having their own “Pride of Place” and aspirations for their country and people… each wants a “place in the Sun.”

    But it’s not just assumptions, it’s attitudes which count as well.

    We thought we could bully nation-states with non-military actions to get our way… with no repercussions… so our military was caught short.

    We were wrong and here we sit.

    Every Nation-State has to know its limitations including the U. S.

    No Empire has ever survived… not one.

    We are not an exception.

    Get to know it.

  7. Chris Kane

    April 3, 2023 at 10:08 am

    U.S. military recruiting and retention problems are approaching the catastrophic phase. It is clear to every educated person that lowering standards and demanding leftist sexual ideology are neither attractive to potential recruits nor will it be a war winner. But, hey. This is the new America. At the same time we are downsizing the corps, we are emptying warehouses of munitions and military gear. Actually, this is a great idea from the point-of-view of the relatively few major defense industries. Retiring military leaders and political insiders of all stripes couldn’t be more thrilled. Think of the opportunities to make money! I mean the Russians obviously followed this basic plan, haven’t they?

  8. jeff

    April 3, 2023 at 11:17 am

    One commenter replied that “This topic requires zero discussion”. That is how we got to where we are today. Democrats focus on what is important to them and ignore all other issues.

    We are facing some very dangerous world events and they are being given little consideration. A great relearning is in store and it may require the blood of many servicemen/women before it is learned.

  9. Lawrence R Smith

    April 3, 2023 at 1:14 pm

    maybe not having full magazines could be good in a war , e.g., w/China. Forces will run out of ammo in a week then have to settle diplomatically, or simply retreat leaving the field of battle to the winner. Either way, less casualties.

  10. Whodunnit

    April 3, 2023 at 1:20 pm

    The key word missed was ‘conventional’ munitions. Would the US envisage entering a war such as the slugging match currently taking place in Ukraine with tens of thousands of ‘conventional’ dumb artillery shells traded daily or is their planning focused more on cruise missiles, smart bombs, gps guided artillery shells etc. Even the Russian doctrine of an initial massive artillery bombardment in itself requiring huge stockpiles of dumb (conventional) shells – failed to foresee an engagement lasting this long. If it had lasted the predicted 3-5 days would Milley even be having the conversation ? Any modern army and the Russian armed forces cannot realistically be classed as such given their abject failure over the past 12 months, would have resolved this within weeks without having run down their stockpiled inventory.

  11. Ben d'Mydogtags

    April 3, 2023 at 2:49 pm

    “Assumptions are suppositions taken as true in the absence of proof. They are unavoidable in planning, but using assumptions incurs risk. Planners must identify the role of assumptions in their plans and the impact if key assumptions are invalid. Similarly, planners must also identify the impact of constraints and restraints on the operation. Any assumption that is not validated, to include assumptions from strategic or higher headquarters guidance, becomes a risk to either the mission, force, or both.” (Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Planning” December 2020, published by the office of the Joint Chief of Staff {i.e. Milley’s office})

    Apparently the Chairman and his staff do not read or follow their own doctrine. Milley as the former commander of TRADOC should also be familiar with the US Army’s Military Decision Making Process which is quite similar to the Joint Operational Planning Process. Both of these processes emphasize the importance of separating provable facts from assumptions. Assumptions must be clearly identified as such. Assumptions are only allowed when they are necessary to move the plan forward, but then they must be tested and the risks of using those assumptions must be continuously assessed.

  12. Allan

    April 3, 2023 at 3:05 pm

    Will able fighting men and high morale be a factor in the next war? In airports today, I see the current crop of service personnel. Many are chubby, stretching their camo uniforms to near bursting. They and the system that tolerates this disregard for regulations and fitness does not inspire confidence.

  13. David Chang

    April 3, 2023 at 4:47 pm

    God bless people in the world.

    Thanks Doctor for the question of Logistic.
    We learn from veterans and remember history.

    “Logistic Support”
    by Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.

    Ammunition Logistics
    “In March of 1965, the only U.S. Army ammunition stocks in Vietnam were those belonging to the 5th Special Forces units based in Nha Trang and the armed helicopter units based at Tan Son Nhut.

    The former was a mixture of modern, World War II and foreign munitions, all in limited quantities re-supplied monthly from Okinawa. The latter was essentially helicopter ammunition: 7.62-mm, 40-mm Grenade, 2.75″ Rocket, and various signal flares and smoke grenades.

    The stockage on hand fluctuated around 1,500 short tons at Tan Son Nhut which was stored in an old French storage site on the Airbase. Even this quantity was too much for the facility which had safe storage capacity of approximately 900 short tons under a waiver due to its proximity to fuel storage, napalm mixing sites, and the main airbase runway.

    Elsewhere in the Pacific Theater, U.S. Army Pacific had ammunition reserves stored in Korea, Japan, Hawaii, Okinawa, and Thailand plus a limited supply in the Department of the Army Forward Floating Depot in the Philippines. These stocks were for the most part reserved for Commander in Chief Pacific contingency plans and were earmarked for deployment with U.S. Army Pacific units. The contingency plan for Southeast Asia stated that units would carry their basic loads and would be supported for the first 180 days by Push Packages of ammunition shipped from Continental U.S. depots.

    Based on the decision at the 9-11 April 1965 Hawaii Conference to deploy combat units to Vietnam, several ammunition related actions were implemented: ammunition depot and supply point locations were selected, real estate was acquired, ammunition units were included in force requirements plans, and a stockage objective of 60 days in-country was planned in conjunction with a 30-day off-shore reserve to be established on Okinawa. The 60-day in-country stockage objective was to consist of 45 days at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and the Saigon area, and 15 days in Ammunition Supply Points.

    Concurrent with this planning and, perhaps a portent of things to come, the 1st Logistical Command requisitioned from the 2d Logistical Command on Okinawa a 15-day supply of ammunition to support the 173d Airborne Brigade which was earmarked for early deployment to Vietnam. However, this requisition was canceled by the 2d Logistical Command as the Push Packages from Continental U.S. would sustain the deploying units until normal pipeline operations could be established. Things didn’t work quite that well. The 173d Airborne Brigade deployed rapidly and immediately commenced combat operations and the Push Packages, delivered in 30-day increments were far short of the quantity being consumed and also contained obsolete ammunition such as anti-tank mines, 3.5″ rockets, and antitank munitions for 90-mm tank guns and 100-mm recoilless rifles. As a consequence, the 1st Logistical Command requisition was purified and initiated anew. This time ammunition, approximately 225 tons, was immediately airlifted from Okinawa to Tan Son Nhut. This action tied up all the available transport aircraft in the theater for a 7-day period and also dangerously overloaded the ammunition Storage site at Tan Son Nhut, as this input coupled with the Push Packages totaled more than 4,000 short tons.

    The findings and recommendations of this team represented a critical upturn in ammunition logistics and are synopsized as follows:

    1. Immediately implement the doctrine for Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations (FM 9-6) throughout the theater.

    2. Organize an Ammunition Staff headed by a full colonel, reporting to the G-4, U.S. Army Vietnam.

    3. Establish an Ammunition Group as quickly as possible to provide operational control and management over ammunition and ammunition units.

    4. Reassign the 182d Stock Control Detachment to G-4, U. S. Army Vietnam.


    Fiscal Year Army Total Army Southeast Asia
    1965 338 303
    1966 1313 853
    1967 1329 1007
    1968 2328 2266
    1969 2913 2719
    1970 1731 1456

    Ammunition Shortages

    Almost from the onset ammunition shortages developed. Some shortages initially evolved from port thru-put problems and in-country distribution problems. The effects of these shortages were blunted to a degree in some instances by application of Available Supply Rates and by airlift of ammunition from the offshore reserve on Okinawa. These shortages were generally short lived and correctable within the capability of the system. However long term shortages also developed which were not easily overcome.

    On the one hand were those long term shortages which prevailed from the onset. On the other hand were those shortages which developed in late 1966 which were attributed to the unforeseen high consumption rates and the inability of the Continental U.S. production base to expand at a pace consistent with the buildup of forces in Vietnam.

    In the former category were shortages related to ammunition items which were: developed for, or highly applicable to, Southeast Asia, were either still in the research and development or product improvement phase, or so newly into production that required production schedules had not been attained. Examples of items in this category were the 40-mm ammunition for the M75 helicopter armament system, M557 Fuze for 81-mm Mortar, the new family of antipersonnel artillery ammunition, the 2.75″ rocket, and the M564/M565 family of Mechanical Time, Super quick and Mechanical Time artillery fuzes. Most of these shortages were ultimately resolved through adherence to controlled expenditures or Available Supply Rates, and temporary use of substitute items.

    In the latter category, an entirely different situation existed. Certain ammunition items were being expended at such a high rate that D to P stocks, as well as all other available assets, would be consumed to the extent that the situation would culminate in a zero balance in-country before production could catch up to expenditures (P-day) . A reevaluation was made to encourage a reduction in the Required Supply Rate and application of stringent Available Supply Rates where necessary to preclude additional leadtime for production expansion. Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, immediately conducted a detailed analysis of the worldwide asset status contained in the 1322 report and notified Commander in Chief Pacific on 7 September 1966 that eight ammunition items would reach zero balance in the near future and the situation would not be alleviated even with immediate increases in production due to order and shiptime limitations. Concurrently, Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific’s analysis revealed that 21 additional items would also reach zero balance in forthcoming months.

    At an ammunition conference at Commander in Chief Pacific in October 1966, the correlation of data and a review of the facts emphasized the gravity of the situation. Immediate action was initiated at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army to bring the situation under control. At the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics level, the Office of Special Assistant for Munitions, headed up by Brigadier General Henry A. Rasmussen was informally established on 14 November 1966 and formally chartered on 15 December 1966 for the express purpose of putting the necessary resources together to provide intensive overall management of forty combat critical high dollar value ammunition items. A corollary action involved the establishment of the Department of the Army Allocation Committee Ammunition in September 1966. This committee, under the control of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, was concerned with the allocation, distribution and redistribution of all allocable ground ammunition. Ammunition was designated as allocable when actual or potential demand was determined to be greater than supply availability. The number of allocable items increased steadily from the initial eight items to ninety-seven by late 1969. Initially, the Department of the Army Allocation Committee Ammunition met almost daily. However, the frequency soon stabilized to a monthly schedule and by February of 1970, the Committee was meeting bi-monthly. The task undertaken by these two agencies was successful in alleviating the gravity of the envisioned shortages to the extent that no combat operations failed or were unduly influenced in their outcome by lack of adequate ammunition.”

    Moreover, the precision ammunition is difficult to transport and assemble with the usual method, so the safety regulation of replenishment port and fast combat-support ship are more important.

    God bless America.

  14. G. Steele

    April 3, 2023 at 5:07 pm

    1. No US grade school is teaching algebra.
    2. We don’t stock massive piles of conventional munitions because we do combined arms, air superiority and precision.
    3. We don’t have the capacity to build 3 Arleigh-Burke DDG-51 Block IIIs a year; Xhina launches 9-12 Type 055s a year.
    4. We can deliver neither SM6s nor Harpoon Block II in a timely fashion.

  15. Steven Naslund

    April 4, 2023 at 4:28 am

    Wow, more horrible analysis. First of all the Ukraine war is not a valid example. The US is not going to be in an artillery slug fest for a year. We have PGMs and long range systems to eliminate artillery quickly. Anyone remember Saddam’s massive artillery advantage touted in Desert Storm that became a non-issue ? In Korea, how long would it take the US to bomb everything in range of artillery ? Russia is giving us a good example of mid 20th century warfare, we shouldn’t follow it. Why are you looking to the horribly inept Russians and barely ready Ukrainians as examples. The US is nothing like either of them. The boggie man of Russia turned out to be a paper tiger that cannot even defeat the Ukraine so we need a new threat. North Korea is not going to get to use their vaunted artillery systems because they do not have a credible air force. China the other “new boogie man” has never engaged in a major war since the communist revolution and is separated from all of their potential adversaries by large oceans. There is no indication that they have mastered the logistics of long range warfare and the combat performance of their military is completely unproven. They are a nuclear threat but we are a MUCH larger nuclear threat. If China thought they could easily retake Taiwan they would have done so but it appears that they know the realities of a modern amphibious/ airborne operation against a modern force. Remember this is from the same “naval experts” that think the DDG-1000 destroyers were a good choice and that we needed littoral combat ships that they are now asking to eliminate far before the end of their expected service life. If I had one take away from the Ukraine war it would be the total irrelevance of major naval surface combatants. The Ukraine which has no Navy to speak of managed to put several major Russian combatants on the bottom with asymmetrically cheap ordinance. With this kind of teaching in America’s war colleges and Academies it is no wonder we have the Navy running into civilian vessels, losing assault carriers dockside, and near mutinies over living conditions for our sailors.

  16. David Chang

    April 4, 2023 at 9:36 am

    God bless people in the world.

    We remember the past and make sure we don’t do the same wrong.
    Honest is the best policy.

    Democratic Party doesn’t assess the ammunition shortage of Ukraine socialism warfare before the war, and provokes the CCP with insufficient US Army  budget and delayed USN construction program and insufficient ammunition of the U.S. Military.

    However, Democratic Party still promotes socialism policies with Communist Party and EU SPD, making the insufficient budget of NATO  and insufficient maintenance of weapons. But Democratic Party doesn’t confess their sin, so they say that the CCP is not a threat.

    Democratic Party cooperates with the Communist Party from World War 2, causing the U.S. military to lose the Socialism War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghan. Now the whole threat to the U.S. military is not only Russia, but also the CCP, North Korea, Iran, and Africa. Therefore, Democratic Party makes the U.S. finances and the Unified Command Plan to fail.

    God bless America. 

  17. Charles Shirley

    April 5, 2023 at 6:14 pm

    You had me right up until “their year zero was 1991-1992”. I finished that paragraph and stopped reading. At minimum your entire timeline is is screwed up. But you need to go back and rethink your entire theory starting with some facts. Here’s one, And it’s both ironic and hilarious But only as it pertains to your article. Outside of that context I’m appalled and saddened by the fact. I promise you that was NOT United States military “year zero” I know this, because I was there, obviously you weren’t.

    USAF Desert Storm veteran. IYAAYAS
    9/11/91 WE WILL NEVER FORGET!!

  18. David Chang

    April 6, 2023 at 12:23 pm

    God bless people in the world.

    The meaning of year zero is about atheism, such as 4th Generation Warfare, which is a wrong military assumption. Because of the Policy in the 20th Century is atheism, another synonym are Brave New World or New Order or New Deal, after the dismission of USSR, the strategy theory of the United States is from the atheism propagated by politics scholars, they deny the USSR is a socialism alliance, so the 9/11 incident is the sin caused by atheism, and Bin Laden’s constitutional thought is the same as most politics scholars in the world.

    Harvard University is an atheism university, and they teach the same atheism constitutional thought as the Communist Party, that is democracy and progress. Since the 20th century, the Ivy League and others have taught people in America to believe atheism, such as The Frankfurt school and the Chicago School. All of them believe atheism. However, the early people to promote atheism in the United States are the Democratic-Republican party. They don’t obey Ten Commandments, so they wrote the first version of the Declaration of Independence.

    The constitution or philosophy education we receive is a course determined by atheism scholars, they teach us the same thought as Mao, Hitler and Lenin, with different names, such as National Socialism, another called Social Democracy or Democratic Socialism, and another called Communism.

    Communism is also a lie. It is the legal system of common property. Of which is the planned economy and confiscation of private property. However, the confiscation of private property is an ingenious lie, because people always have their own secret property, no matter how the secret police or prosecutors  monitor or imprison people. The Social Democracy Party also believe atheism. The difference is that they deceive people with another lie, such as participatory democracy or defensive democracy or rolling democracy or indigenous democracy. The Social Democracy Party also practices the planned economy. So all of them claim to be the only representative of ideal socialism, and always accuse each other of being dictator or autocracy or tyrant or imperialism or fascist.

    Because the origin of them is Europe atheism philosophy. In Matthew Chapter 24, Jesus implies that Peter and Paul do not obey Ten Commandments, and then Martin Luther in Germany declares that he can be in heaven by his will, not by God. All of that is democracy.

    But people who obey Ten Commandments which makes people free, being not a hearer without memory but a doer putting it into effect, people will have blessings on their acts.

    God bless America.

  19. Omega 13

    April 18, 2023 at 3:22 pm

    Milley’s problem is that he’s never actually commanded a combat brigade, and doesn’t understand logistics. Always a staffer, never a leader.

    Why did he get promoted from a lack of leadership? He’s a “political officer,” who knows the right butt to kiss, or the right president to suck up to… namely Obama. Milley survived the Obama Officer Purge because he was a good little boy.

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