Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing with and stoking fires in Syria. Following the major military offensive mounted by the Salafi-jihadist forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in late November 2024, Ankara pursues a risky goal.
While HTS forces moved quickly to capture Syria’s second biggest city, Aleppo, from regime control, Turkish-backed militias under the umbrella of the “Syrian National Army” (SNA) are attempting to push Syrian Kurds out of Tel Rifat, Manbij – and possibly the entirety of northern Syria.
The Assad regime, which has managed to hold onto power since the outbreak of civil war in 2011, only with the backing of Russia and Iranian forces, was caught off guard. The United States, which currently has approximately 900 troops advising the Syrian Kurdish forces, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), seems content to simply observe Russian and Iranian interests weaken as HTS forces seem intent on toppling the Assad regime. Rumors also exist, toying with the idea that the Biden administration has been convinced that HTS is not a dangerous jihadist entity and should be permitted to pursue its goal of removing Assad from power. If this is Washington’s strategy, it is a mistake.
While reticence for direct U.S. military involvement in the unfolding conflict is understandable, giving a carte blanche to dangerous jihadist entity to determine the future of a major Arab state should also not be welcome. In addition to or apart from its position on what HTS does, what does Biden intend to do with its Kurdish SDF partners, which may be targeted by the SNA and/or the Turkish military?
If the Syrian regime falls due to HTS advances, it could result in a situation whereby Syria is either governed by a Salafi-jihadist organization, which has historical ties to the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda, or it becomes an ungoverned space with a gaping power vacuum. On the other hand, if the Biden administration does not take steps to protect the SDF from a potential Turkish military and/or Turkish-backed SNA massacre, Washington will have abandoned a vital partner that helped defeat the Islamic State and help compromise the territorial integrity of Syria even further.
It is surely clear to the Biden administration that an HTS decapitation of Assad’s regime will not magically create an environment of regional security. HTS is, at its core, a jihadist entity, whose broader intentions cannot be calculated or trusted. The fluidity of the conflict necessitates measured thinking on the part of US decision-makers, but one which realizes that neither HTS forces nor Turkish actions are motivated by the security concerns of the region, the United States and its partners and allies.
Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, was quick to declare that Turkey played no part in the rebel uprising against the Assad regime. This is hard to believe, given Turkey’s patronage of the SNA, a diverse group of militia forces, close to 70,000 fighters, paid and armed by Turkey. While HTS forces moved quickly to capture Aleppo and now have their sights focused on taking Hama, SNA forces have used this as an opportunity to advance upon territory held by Kurds. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Ankara has opposed the structured support that Washington has given Syrian Kurdish forces in the form of weapons, training and logistics. For the U.S., their SDF partners were the secret sauce to the military defeat of IS. For Ankara, the SDF is an extension of the Kurdish Separatist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which Turkey, the U.S., and the European Union list as a terrorist entity.
But here is where the waters become murky: The SDF is an offshoot of the PKK. It’s civilian and military leaders like Salih Muslim and Mazloum Abdi have never denied this, but as a movement, the Syrian Kurds have been forthright about their intentions not to pursue the historical ambitions of the PKK and carry out terrorist attacks inside Turkey, with the intention of grabbing lands. Instead, their aim has been twofold: to fight against IS, who threatens their very existence and secondly to survive in Assad’s Syria after the end of the conflict.
On the opposing side, SNA forces, which Turkey built up, are legitimate bad actors. SNA forces have been cited for gross human rights violations against Kurds, Yezidis, and women, carrying out untold forms of atrocities. They have also had skirmishes with HTS fighters, which the Turkish government has also backed in the past. HTS went by other names in the past such as Al-Nusra front and Jabhat Al-Nusra which was the Islamic State’s first penetration into Syrian territory. While the Salafi-jihadist leader of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, has successfully rebranded the organization, it is a good idea to remember, that it is just that: rebranding. Neither HTS or SNA or have any progressive goals in sight.
Which brings us to the question of why Turkey would support either one or both of these terrorist entities: In the earlier phases of the Syrian Civil War, Ankara backed HTS because Erdogan backed just about any entity that sought to topple the Assad regime – a goal which he largely gave up on after 2016, when Putin came to the aid of Syria. Subsequently, the presentation of Syrian Kurds as terrorists, became an obsession for Erdogan, mainly as a rallying cry for Turkish domestic politics. Erdogan was successful in demonizing the SDF as being the same as the PKK. It is worth noting that Syrian Kurds have not carried out one threat or action against Turkey. Additionally, prior to branding them as terrorists, Erdogan considered Salih Muslim as a benign actor, whom he personally hosted in Ankara in 2012. Finally, there is a nationalist vein inside the pro-Erdogan media, which is desirous in expanding Turkish territory. Following HTS’ capture of Aleppo, pro-Erdogan personalities started cheering for Aleppo to be added to Turkey as its 82nd province.
There should be no circumstances under which Washington supports HTS as they proceed to attempt regime change. Conversely, Washington must conceive a realistic strategy to stand by its Kurdish partners. This could be achieved simply by bolstering U.S. presence in Kurdish held territory in Rojava, and clearly communicate to all actors that the U.S. stands by its partners and will not permit harm to come to them. Such a message must be communicated most clearly to Ankara, which intends to eliminate the Rojava autonomous lands.
Syrian Kurds have steadfastly focused on survival, and combatting jihadism, while HTS and Turkish-backed SNA forces harbor far more sinister ambitions. Since the capture of Aleppo, SDF military sources have thus far negotiated a withdrawal of Kurdish civilians from rural parts of Aleppo, rather than fight. What is to stop/deter HTS or SNA forces from demanding a complete Kurdish withdrawal from significant parts of Rojava? It would be hard for Salih Muslim and Mazloum Abdi – the Kurdish leadership to accept this, as they would rightly fear displacement and annihilation. For the United States to stay silent on this, would be an explicit acceptance that Washington would rather accept parts (or perhaps all) of Syria which is under the control of jihadists. We unsuccessfully fought two big wars against such an ideology and sacrificed much blood and treasure. We cannot condone its resurgence inside Syria, which would inevitably spread beyond its borders if given the opportunity.
About the Author: Sinan Ciddi
Sinan Ciddi is a non-resident senior fellow at FDD and an expert on Turkish politics. He is also an Associate Professor of National Security Studies at Marine Corps University (MCU). Prior to joining MCU, Sinan was the Executive Director of the Institute of Turkish Studies, based at Georgetown University (2011-2020). He continues to serve as an Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Sinan is the author of Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party: Secularism and Nationalism (Routledge, January 2009) a book which explains the electoral weakness of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party. He obtained his Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London in 2007 in the field of Political Science.
