The new President of the United States, Donald Trump, recently issued an informal appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin, urging him to end the “ridiculous war” in Ukraine and make a “deal.” It is quite clear that the war in Ukraine is weakening havoc on the Russian economy, and, like any prolonged conflict, it could threaten internal stability in the country.
But what would compel Vladimir Putin to reject such a deal, even if it offers him a way out?
What Would It Take for Putin to Agree to a Ukraine Peace Deal?
There is a reasonable argument that the primary rational goal of the war in Ukraine, from Putin’s perspective, has been to maintain his grip on power in Russia. This same argument likely remains central to his decision-making now. The consistent rise in his approval ratings and securing his own victory are the main objectives he seeks in this war.
It is important to note that the continuation of the war bolsters his internal position and consolidates Russian society around him. The war itself provides justification for both Putin’s prolonged hold on power (“don’t switch horses mid-stream”) and for the country’s economic hardships (“tightening belts” becomes acceptable because the nation is facing a difficult situation with enemies on all sides).
So, to make a “deal” acceptable to Putin, it must align with his primary goal: remaining in power after the war ends. This means the deal must allow Putin to present it as a victory, at least within Russia.
What are the essential aspects of a deal that would enable Putin to claim victory domestically?
Sanctions Relief
Without the war, there would be no justification for Russia’s decline in living standards—economically and through isolation in various spheres. It would no longer be obvious why people should continue supporting a president who has been in power for over 25 years.
For Putin to stay in power, the lives of Russians must improve compared to what they were before the war began.
On the other hand, lifting sanctions would provide a major opportunity for the Kremlin to frame the outcome as a victory for Russia in the war and a demonstration of the West’s weakness. One doesn’t need to be a clairvoyant to predict the narratives that the Kremlin would propagate:
Victory over the West: “The West couldn’t sustain their pressure and had to lift sanctions because of Russia’s strength and resolve. The West can’t survive without Russia. They tried and they failed.”
Global recognition: “The world has acknowledged Russia’s rightful place as a great power.”
Victory over economic warfare: “Sanctions were meant to destroy Russia, but we emerged stronger.”
Economic recovery: “The lifting of sanctions will allow us to rebuild, strengthen, and innovate our economy for the future.”
Words matter
A peace deal that appears to be a retreat or defeat could severely damage Putin’s image as a strong, decisive leader—a cornerstone of his domestic legitimacy. Putin might fear that any concessions could alienate the hawks within his government, eroding the support he depends on.
There are also strong historical references to past Russian leaders, such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin, whose perceived capitulation to the West led to political decline. These associations are deeply ingrained in Russian societal consciousness and impose constraints on future negotiations’ potential success.
In this context, acceptable statements for Putin would need to be neutral, leaving room for Russian propaganda to reinterpret the terms in a way that aligns with the Kremlin’s narrative.
The Future of Ukraine
I’m deliberately placing Ukraine third, as the primary issue for Russia’s victory would be the victory over the West.
A declaration or agreement guaranteeing Ukraine’s neutral status would be essential for Russia to claim a victory. The threat of Ukrainian alignment with NATO or the West remains one of Moscow’s primary concerns.
Drawing an analogy to Germany’s post-World War II division, Russia would be happy to present a scenario where Ukraine is split into separate zones of influence (with the Russian zone essentially being the same territory previously occupied). This division narrative could be framed as a geopolitical victory for Russia, referring to the Soviet Union’s accomplishments during the Cold War and tying it to a broader narrative of Russia restoring its status as a global power.
The Return of the Kursk Territory
Certain territorial compromises, such as those involving regions like Kursk, present significant challenges. Kursk is not merely a geopolitical issue; it is deeply tied to Russia’s national identity as an integral part of the country. Any concessions regarding this territory would be nearly impossible to justify to the Russian public.
It is important to reiterate that Putin’s fears—losing power, appearing weak, or facing accountability—could outweigh the potential benefits of a deal. For Putin, a peace deal that threatens his hold on power could be more terrifying than the war itself.
In this sense, the West faces an extraordinarily difficult task: bringing an end to the war and saving lives without legitimizing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or aiding Putin in his quest to remain in power. Meeting Vladimir Putin’s demands as part of a peace deal would inevitably strengthen his authoritarian regime in Russia. It would allow Putin to portray himself as a victorious leader who defied the West.
About the Author: Dr. Olga Vlasova
Olga Vlasova is a Visiting Scholar at King’s Russia Institute (King’s College London), specialising in Russian politics. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Lomonosov Moscow State University, focusing on comparative educational policies in Europe. Currently, her research examines the “politics of fear and pacification” in Russia, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. In addition to her academic career, Olga has played an active role in Russian politics. Her involvement spans parliamentary and presidential campaigns, as well as the regional development of the Russian opposition democratic party Yabloko. Her research interests include propaganda, digital authoritarianism, and political education.
