The altercation that took place during President Zelensky’s Washington visit left the future of American-Ukraine relations in question. It has also shaken long-standing trans-Atlantic ties. European leaders have explicitly questioned the credibility of America’s commitment to their security. The argument in the White House has put that historic arrangement in doubt.
Hesitation and Escalation: How the Present Ukraine Situation Unfolded
The case for a restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity is principled and strong. However, the criticisms that a Trump-brokered peace deal might achieve less than total victory are dishonest. Since the 2022 Russian invasion, both Washington during the Biden administration and the European allies have only given Kyiv just enough to keep fighting.
They never offered enough to win. If more robust support had been made available from the start, the war might have already been won. The real culprit, in addition to Vladimir Putin, has been hesitation and “escalation management.”
The longer a war drags on, the greater the casualties and the costs. Trump has been clear on his aspiration to end the war and bring peace, unlike his predecessor who made no such effort. Suddenly however, in the wake of the Oval office argument and in conjunction with Vice President Vance’s Munich address, bigger issues are at stake: not just Ukraine but the future of trans-Atlantic security arrangements.
To get beyond the current crisis, there are several possible paths with varying implications for US national interest.
Path One: Trump’s Peace Plan
First, the optimal solution would be for Zelensky to accept Trump’s offer to return. The door to the White House remains open. Zelensky would have to swallow his pride and embrace a peace plan. This may involve some concession of mineral rights.
For a peace plan to be credible however, the terms have to include the future security of Ukraine. The possible components of a post-war plan are clear, including some or all of a Korea-style demilitarized zone, European troops, and an American backstop.
The Europeans appear to be ready, after years of hectoring from Washington, to step up their defense game.
It is not only Ukraine that should be concerned about security on the day after. Washington too should worry about the consequences of an insufficient arrangement. If the Trump administration signs on to a peace plan that enables Russia to march in and occupy the rest of Ukraine, the blame will belong to the President alone.
He will own the fall of Kyiv the way Biden owns the fall of Kabul. He should not want that legacy. Peace has to be better than surrender.
Path Two: Europe’s Strategic Autonomy
Second, while some European leaders are trying to rebuild the bridge between Ukraine and America, they may not succeed. They face isolationist resistance in Washington, as well as at home some never failing European anti-Americanism.
Other voices in Europe are already envisioning a dramatic reduction in the American presence. At stake then is not only the defense of Ukraine but the defense of Europe as a whole, potentially without U.S. support. In that case, Europe will have to respond with a rapid ramp-up in its defense spending, and not only for the sake of Ukraine. Those plans are well under way.
Greater European responsibility for its own defense has long been a goal of American policy. President Trump in his first term pushed hard for Europeans to do more. The sudden turn toward increased defense spending in Europe is therefore, ironically, a Trump success.
Yet the emerging version of European “strategic autonomy,” to use French President Macron’s term, may take place outside of NATO and therefore beyond American oversight.
A Europe that does not trust the American nuclear umbrella will want to see England and France, the two European nuclear powers, increase their own stockpiles. If the American nuclear umbrella is withdrawn, Europe’s nuclear arsenal will grow. This scenario means budget savings for the U.S., but it also points to reduced American control over growing European military power including nuclear proliferation.
Path Three: The China Factor
Third, China represents America’s key challenge today. The administration’s Ukraine policy can be understood as part of a grand strategy effort to peel Russia away from China, a mirror image of Nixon’s 1972 opening to China that pulled it away from the USSR.
That strategy succeeded in breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance, but only at the price of embracing the “One China Policy” that put Taiwan at risk. Is Ukrainian independence similarly being offered up as the price for a rapprochement with Russia?
If that exchange is indeed the real-political transaction currently underway, it is vital to see concrete steps from Moscow, some genuine quid pro quo for concessions on Ukraine. Yet from the outside, there is no evidence that the Kremlin has sent any signs of compromise. On the contrary, it continues its campaign of conquest.
More importantly for Washington, one sees no indication that Russia might truly distance itself from Beijing. If the U.S. is conceding points to Russia–on the back of the Ukrainians–we need something in return, especially because of the likely damage a deal will do to American credibility more broadly.
Risks Beyond Ukraine
Making unilateral concessions to the enemy was the hallmark of the misguided policies of the Biden administration. That naivete should not be repeated today. Meanwhile America faces a risk larger than the prospect of a Russian occupation of Ukraine: the collapse of the Atlantic alliance.
If Europe is rebuffed by Washington, it has other options. It might choose to deepen its trade dependence on China.
That would have the effect of strengthening Beijing, precisely that adversary many view as the primary threat. In a worst case outcome, the U.S. allows Russia to swallow Ukraine, but Russia does not change course.
Instead, it remains fully aligned with China, while Europe reorients itself, away from the Atlantic and drives down the Silk Road to Beijing. We need a better deal. “America First” should not mean America isolated from the rest of the world.
About the Author: Dr. Russell A. Berman
Russell A. Berman is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of German Studies at Stanford University. He served as Senior Advisor on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Dept in the first Trump administration.
