The evolution of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) has always been a response to emerging and unconventional threats. From the bold ingenuity of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II to the strategic foresight that created the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, the path of American special operations has mirrored the shifting nature of global conflict. Yet, despite its growing and demonstrable contributions to national defense, SOF remains institutionally underrepresented at the highest levels of defense policymaking.
Recognizing the SOF
It is time to take the next logical step in the maturation of SOF: make the Commander of USSOCOM a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) member as the Chief of Special Operations (CSO).
This position is not a call to make SOF a separate military service. USSOCOM would continue its existing relationships with the services for recruitment, manpower, service-common logistics, and training. However, making the USSOCOM Commander a statutory JCS member—alongside the Chiefs of the traditional services, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Commander of US Space Command—would institutionalize special operations’ central role in and contributions to homeland defense, deterring China, irregular warfare, and 21st-century conflict to include SOF support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders to win wars of large scale combat operations. It would provide SOF with the voice it has earned through decades of operational impact and enhance the Chairman’s charge to provide the President with the best military advice, which must include special operations.
The Roots: OSS, Nunn-Cohen, and Goldwater-Nichols
America’s modern special operations enterprise is born from the legacy of the OSS, a pioneering World War II organization charged with sabotage, subversion, espionage, and support to resistance to aid US and allied forces in winning the war. Its innovative ethos became the cultural bedrock of modern SOF (and the intelligence community). Yet after the war, the nation allowed those capabilities to atrophy, only to rebuild them after repeated failures in irregular warfare and counterterrorism.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act restructured the US military for joint operations. It set the stage for the following year’s Nunn-Cohen Amendment, which created USSOCOM as a functional unified combatant command with unique responsibilities. Importantly, Nunn-Cohen also established the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) to oversee the command, reflecting Congress’s intent to centralize responsibility for oversight of all US special operations and “low-intensity conflict” or what we now call irregular warfare.
USSOCOM: “Service-Like” Is Not Enough
Congress clearly envisioned USSOCOM as more than a niche force. The command was given “service-like” authority over budget, doctrine, research and development, procurement, and training. But that term—“service-like”—has become one of the most anemic phrases in the defense lexicon. It implies equivalence without parity, autonomy without authority, and responsibility without the influence necessary to fulfill it.
In the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 922 sought to correct this by enhancing the authority of ASD SO/LIC, attempting to provide SOF with service-level civilian oversight. Yet the Department of Defense has not adequately empowered ASD SO/LIC and institutional barriers remain. Unlike the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps chiefs, the USSOCOM Commander lacks a statutory seat on the JCS—a body critical in shaping force development, strategic priorities, and resource allocation.
The Strategic Imperative
USSOCOM has long since outgrown its origins as a niche counterterrorism force and is now a foundational element of US national defense. Today, SOF contributes across the full spectrum of conflict—from strategic competition with China and Russia to deterrence to countering transnational terrorism and enabling partner nation forces. Its persistent forward presence, deep relationships with allies, and adaptability to low-visibility missions make it essential to defending the homeland by fighting “away games.”
USSOCOM supports every Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and often serves as the connective tissue of coalition and interagency operations. Yet without a JCS vote or permanent seat at the table, SOF is disadvantaged in inter-service debates over priorities, funding, and strategic concept development. It cannot fully advocate for the capabilities and force structure necessary to fulfill the nation’s increasingly demanding missions.
Aligning with the Evolution of Defense Leadership
In 2012, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was made a permanent JCS member, recognizing the Guard’s growing operational contributions. More recently, the Commander of US Space Command gained permanent representation – acknowledging the domain-centric nature of modern conflict. By any metric – budget, global reach, operational tempo, and strategic value – USSOCOM stands alongside them. It is illogical and outdated to exclude the SOF enterprise from the nation’s highest military advisory body.
With the return of strategic competition and the proliferation of gray zone conflict, irregular warfare is no longer a peripheral mission but a core competency for national survival. Whether deterring China, contesting malign influence, or reinforcing partner capacity, SOF leads. Its global network of relationships enables not just burden sharing but burden owning, allowing allies to take more responsibility for regional defense within an integrated framework.
At the same time, the ASD SO/LIC’s role would become that of a service secretary, making the position the Secretary of Special Operations (SSO). Together, the Chef of Special Operations and the Secretary of Special Operations would enhance our national defense capabilities by bringing SOF into the 21st Century,
A Moment for Change
The current national leadership is demonstrating boldness in defense reform. The Trump Administration and its Department of Defense have emphasized innovation, force modernization, and revitalizing deterrence. This is an ideal moment to correct an institutional imbalance and ensure SOF has the voice and authority it needs to shape the future of warfare.
Making the USSOCOM Commander a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recognize the command’s strategic contributions and align the military’s advisory structure with the operational realities of modern conflict. The Chief of Special Operations would not replace existing service chiefs but complement them—ensuring that special operations, irregular warfare, and strategic competition receive the full weight of joint attention.
This is not just a symbolic gesture. It is the next logical step in a historic journey—from OSS to USSOCOM, from Nunn-Cohen to Section 922. It is time for special operations to take their rightful seat at the table.
David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and unconventional and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. He was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University after retirement. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.
About the Author: David Maxwell
David Maxwell, a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and the editor of Small Wars Journal. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation of Defense of Democracies and the Global Peace Foundation (where he focuses on a free and unified Korea).

William J. Kassel
May 7, 2025 at 12:26 am
David,
It would be intriguing to hear your take on North and South Korean unification. Aftermath of China, and an OSS Office in Mongolia.
Cheers!
Wild Willy 111 1111 001 X