Canada’s defense establishment has finally woken up to the reality that submarines matter. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s pledge to acquire up to twelve conventionally powered boats is being spun as the cornerstone of a more credible defense strategy. But the entire plan is being built on a foundation that doesn’t exist. Because without Arctic basing, sustainment, and operational infrastructure, those submarines – conventional or nuclear – will be little more than floating symbols of a country that refuses to take its geography seriously.
Canada’s Arctic is vast. It spans over 40 percent of our territory, with a coastline longer than that of Russia and the United States combined. And yet, as of May 2025, Canada has no operational naval base north of 60 degrees. None. The much-hyped Nanisivik Naval Facility on Baffin Island – announced in 2007, delayed repeatedly, and quietly downgraded – still lacks permanent staff, a functioning dry dock, or the year-round operational capacity needed to support even modest naval deployments.
Canada Victoria-Class Submarine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
This is not a minor logistical issue. It is a fundamental strategic failure. If Canada wants to operate submarines in the Arctic – whether to monitor foreign incursions, protect sovereignty claims, or contribute meaningfully to NATO and NORAD deterrence – those boats need places to dock, refit, rearm, and shelter. Right now, the Navy’s only options are Esquimalt, on the Pacific, and Halifax, on the Atlantic – thousands of nautical miles from the high Arctic. That means any submarine deployed north must transit enormous distances before it can even begin its mission, and then return all the way south for maintenance. This is not a sustainable posture. It is performative presence masquerading as strategy.
Carney’s submarine plan makes no mention of Arctic basing. That omission is not just concerning – it’s damning. Because without Arctic ports, you cannot operate in the Arctic. Full stop.
The Americans understand this. So do the Norwegians, the Danes, and even the Russians. All of them have built, expanded, or modernized Arctic naval infrastructure in the past decade. The U.S. Navy has revived Arctic exercises, deployed more ice-hardened ships, and upgraded ports in Alaska. Norway has built new facilities in Tromsø and Ramsund. Russia, for all its internal weaknesses, has poured resources into the Northern Fleet and surrounding support installations. These countries know that if you’re not based in the Arctic, you’re not present in the Arctic. And if you’re not present, you’re irrelevant.
Canada, by contrast, has spent the better part of twenty years announcing icebreakers and ports that never arrive. We’ve become experts in laying ceremonial cornerstones, commissioning artist renderings, and then quietly shelving the hard infrastructure when cost or political will becomes inconvenient. Nanisivik was supposed to be a full-fledged naval station. Today, it’s a glorified fuel depot—operational in summer, deserted in winter, and unfit for submarine operations at any time.
Carney’s failure to address this is strategic malpractice. Submarines are not self-sustaining miracle weapons. They require a massive support ecosystem: dry docks, resupply points, secure communications nodes, emergency response capabilities, and access to satellite and undersea surveillance networks. If any one of these is missing, the fleet becomes a liability rather than an asset. Canada doesn’t just lack one of these – it lacks all of them north of the Arctic Circle.
And it’s not just a Navy problem. The Air Force lacks Arctic runways capable of supporting sustained operations with modern fighter jets like the F-35. The Army lacks permanent northern deployments. Joint exercises are rare, under-resourced, and mostly designed for public relations rather than combat readiness. Our entire posture in the North is based on the premise that no one will ever test it.
That premise is no longer viable.
Russia is increasingly active in the Arctic. China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and is investing in ice-capable surveillance vessels and seabed mapping technology. And as the ice recedes, new shipping lanes, resource extraction sites, and strategic choke points are emerging – points that will require not just claims of sovereignty but the capacity to defend them. That means forward basing. That means actual military infrastructure. That means ports that can service submarines.
Carney has a choice. He can continue the Trudeau-era pattern of defense symbolism – submarine announcements with no basing strategy, Arctic sovereignty speeches with no Arctic assets – or he can confront the hard truth: until Canada builds the infrastructure to support sustained Arctic operations, no amount of procurement will matter.
This would require real money and real political capital. It would mean upgrading Nanisivik or building a new naval facility altogether – possibly in Cambridge Bay, Inuvik, or Tuktoyaktuk. It would mean investing in ice-hardened support vessels, undersea cables, satellite networks, and all-weather surveillance systems. And it would mean finally treating the North as a theater of operations, not a political photo op.
None of this is glamorous. It doesn’t generate headlines. But it is essential.
Even if Canada opts to stick with conventional submarines – rather than the nuclear-powered boats that would make more sense for endurance and range – the infrastructure challenge remains. Conventional boats need even more frequent resupply and maintenance. They cannot stay submerged as long. They are more sensitive to environmental conditions. And without local support, they will be limited to token patrols at best.
Victoria-Class Submarine Canadian Navy. Image Credit: Government Photo.
Worse, failure to build this infrastructure will compromise not only our own operations but also our credibility with allies. NATO is watching. So is the United States. If Canada cannot field a credible Arctic presence, those allies will begin to build around us. U.S. planning in the Arctic already favors partnerships with Norway and Denmark over deeper integration with Canadian Forces. AUKUS Pillar II is progressing without us. NORAD modernization is quietly skewing toward U.S. systems and installations.
This is what strategic marginalization looks like – not a dramatic expulsion, but a quiet exclusion from meaningful planning and operations.
Carney has the political capital to change this. He has the economic credibility to argue for long-term investment. And he has the geopolitical moment: the Arctic is finally on the radar of Canadians and allies alike. But time is short. The submarine fleet, even if perfectly executed, will take 10 to 15 years to arrive. If the support infrastructure isn’t built now, the boats will be obsolete – or irrelevant – by the time they’re operational.
Canada has coastlines on three oceans, a vast and contested Arctic, and treaty obligations that demand credible military presence. Without ports, we are spectators in our own theater. If Carney wants his submarine fleet to matter, he needs to start building where it counts – on Arctic rock, not just on paper.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, where he writes a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
