Abstract and Key Points: As the Russia-Ukraine war reaches its third anniversary, five key lessons emerge. First, Russia has solidified its status as a long-term European adversary, with NATO’s deterrence efforts set to intensify. Second, large conventional forces remain essential, particularly for potential conflicts in Taiwan. Third, mass atrocities continue despite global outrage, revealing the limits of international resolve. Fourth, Europe’s fragmented military response underscores its failure to develop a unified defense strategy. Finally, drones have revolutionized modern warfare, making battlefields deadlier and further removing soldiers from direct combat. These lessons will shape future conflicts, especially in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Drones, NATO, and Russia: What the Ukraine War Taught the World
The third anniversary of the beginning of the Ukraine War is a useful moment to step back and consider the larger lessons of the war.
The conflict itself has mostly bogged down. Russia has made some advances in the last year, but the costs have been enormous. It is winning only in the sense of a pyrrhic victory – that is, it is losing so much in order to take small increments of territory that the war jeopardizes other Russian strategic interests.
Russia is no longer, for example, a credible peer competitor with China, the US, or the European Union. After three years of unexpectedly hard conflict, it is too economically backward and militarily reduced.
Ukraine, though, is in trouble too. Its manpower and munitions shortages are well-known. And US President Donald Trump has aggressively signaled that he wants the war over as soon as possible. So a deal seems likely soon. Thus, now is an opportune moment to consider the war’s larger story for the future of conflict.
I see five particular lessons going forward:
Putin is a Permanent European Opponent
Russia’s open invasion of a smaller democracy provoked a generational shift in the rest of Europe. It pushed Russia from a prickly, difficult semi-partner into an openly admitted geopolitical opponent.
Russia’s relationship with the West and its partners will not be normalized until its current president, Vladimir Putin, is gone. Trump may like Putin and give him concessions when they meet, but there will be no trust.
Vladimir Putin observes strategic deterrence forces exercise in the Kremlin’s situation room.
European security will be focused on deterring Russia for a generation now – along lines similar to the Cold War, except even more balance-negative for Russia than last time. NATO’s combined economy is a staggering twenty-five times greater than Russia’s. This is the long-term cost to Russia of the war.
Massed Conventional Military Power is Still Necessary
Military history teaches again and again that nothing holds territory like infantry. Because western military doctrine focuses on defense rather than conquest, NATO states tend to have smaller armies than this lesson would suggest.
Nuclear weapons, air-sea battle, counter-insurgency, and so on compete with traditional armies for attention and resources. But sheer mass will come back in Europe as the long-term contest with Russia takes shape.
Tu-22M Bomber from Russia
And in East Asia, this is a critical take-away, because China’s primary regional goal is the taking of Taiwan. Should its army gain a foothold on Taiwan, a large force will be needed to combat it. The US, Taiwan, and Japan do not currently have the requite manpower for that mission.
‘Never Again’ is a Piety
Pundits, especially in the West, have said for years that mass killings like the killing fields of Cambodia or the genocide in Rwanda can never happen again. In Ukraine though, the Russian military has behaved appallingly, and world opinion has mostly just accepted it.
In fact, there has been a concerted disinformation effort to suggest Russian atrocities are not happening.
‘Europe’ is Still a Failure
After three years of war on its doorstep, there is still no integrated European military voice. It is true that European support for Ukraine exceeds American support. But given Europe’s proximity to Ukraine and the Russian threat, a rationalized pipeline of aid should have been developed much more rapidly.
Instead, European aid has only slowly overcome national fragmentation and continues to be low compared to Europe’s overall economic size.
When the US supported the mujahadeen against the Soviets in the 1980s, the CIA set up a fast-moving, well-finance arms and support pipeline in a few years. European NATO has struggled to meet that level of coordination and speed.
Leopard 2 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Ukraine’s president is calling for a European army, and Trump is threatening to abandon Europe. But after so many ostensible turning points which were to motivate an integrated European defense posture, it is hard to imagine it will ever happen.
Drones
If mass’ role on the battlefield is surprisingly unchanged, then the biggest change is probably drones – everywhere. We have all seen drone strike footage on social media these last few years. But their ubiquity has been a shock.
Large, plane-like drones have been around for twenty years, enabling long-distance or over-the-horizon strike. By loitering over the battlefields of the war on terrorism, they provided data to facilitate US strikes from distant bases.
Switchblade drone that is used by Ukraine’s forces against Russia. Image Credit: Industry handout.
But the Ukraine war has added to that by filling the local battlespace with all sorts of small drones used at short-range. These are frequently armed and function like mini-gunships or mini-missiles.
This accelerates the long-term trend, dating back to World War I, of warfighters pulling further and further away from contact on the frontline to fight at a distance, because the battlefield becomes ever more dangerous.
Other lessons will become apparent after the war concludes, but these are the five mostly likely to shape European territorial defense and American strategy in East Asia in the coming decade.
About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly
Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. You can find him on X: @Robert_E_Kelly.
