Throughout the War in Ukraine, some of Russia’s biggest losses have taken place in the Black Sea. Sarting with the sinking of the Moskva, to Ukraine’s persistent drone attacks, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has lost a lot of its former prestige. In the wake of these events, many commentators have written off the Black Sea Fleet as a formidable fighting force.
The Black Sea Fleet Before the War
Before the war, the Black Sea Fleet was a key pillar of Russia’s regional dominance. Based in Sevastopol, a port Russia annexed along with Crimea in 2014, the fleet was tasked with controlling the Black Sea, supporting operations in the eastern Mediterranean, and deterring NATO influence.
It included a mix of surface warships, submarines, amphibious vessels, and support ships, backed by coastal missile systems and naval aviation. The fleet’s strategic location allowed Russia to project power across the region and maintain a strong maritime presence.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Black Sea Fleet played a prominent role. It enforced a naval blockade on Ukraine, launched cruise missile strikes from the sea, and supported amphibious operations along the southern coast. The fleet was instrumental in the siege of Mariupol and the occupation of Snake Island, a small but strategically important outpost in the northwestern Black Sea. These early operations demonstrated the fleet’s offensive capabilities and its integration into Russia’s broader military campaign.
Ukraine’s Asymmetrical Operations
However, the fleet’s dominance was soon challenged. On April 13, 2022, Ukraine struck the fleet’s flagship, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva, with domestically developed Neptune anti-ship missiles. The Moskva sank, marking the largest Russian naval loss since World War II.
This event was a huge moral boost for Ukraine in addition to heavily damaging Russia’s naval prestige. The sinking of the Moskva not only started Ukraine’s campaigns against the Black Sea Fleet, but also triggered a massive propaganda campaign.
Despite having a nearly non-existent navy, Ukraine effectively leveraged asymmetric warfare to counter the Black Sea Fleet. It deployed a combination of domestically produced and Western-supplied anti-ship missiles, including the Neptune and Harpoon systems.
Ukraine also pioneered the use of naval drones and unmanned surface vessels to strike Russian ships and infrastructure. Special operations raids targeted Russian-held ports and facilities in Crimea, while aerial drone strikes disrupted logistics and command centers. These tactics allowed Ukraine to inflict significant damage on the fleet without engaging in traditional naval battles.
The Effect of Ukraine’s Black Sea Campaign
By early 2025, Ukrainian forces had destroyed or damaged at least two dozen Russian vessels, including the Rostov-on-Don, a Kilo-class submarine. These losses forced Russia to reconsider its naval posture in the region.
As Ukrainian attacks intensified, the Black Sea Fleet began relocating its major assets from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, a port further east on the Russian mainland. This strategic withdrawal marked a significant shift in Russia’s maritime strategy and a tacit acknowledgment of Ukraine’s growing capabilities.
The relocation to Novorossiysk had several consequences. Operationally, the port lacked the infrastructure and strategic positioning of Sevastopol, limiting the fleet’s ability to project power across the western Black Sea. The move also reduced Russia’s naval presence near Crimea, weakening its control over the region’s maritime domain.
However, this move also put many of the Black Sea Fleet’s most valuable assets out of Ukraine’s reach, enabling Russia to keep its fleet in operation.
Despite these setbacks, the Black Sea Fleet retained its operational capabilities. Russian warships continued to launch long-range Kalibr cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets from safer waters in the eastern Black Sea.
Russia also adapted by deploying more submarines to reduce exposure to aerial and drone attacks, enhancing coastal defenses in Crimea and Novorossiysk,. These adaptations highlight the push and pull nature of this conflict. As one side adopts new technologies and tactics, the other must quickly find means to counter it, however crude it may be.
The Role of NATO in Ukraine’s Black Sea Operations
While Ukraine’s success in the Black Sea has been impressive, the US and its allies have had a large hand in many of Ukraine’s operations. NATO navies, particularly those of Turkey, Romania, and the United States, increased their presence in the region, conducting more frequent patrols and joint exercises.
NATO UAVs and satellites also frequently scout for targets and vulnerabilities and relay their intelligence to Ukraine. This activity demonstrates the extensive but subtle role of NATO in the war, as some of Ukraine’s most successful strikes have been carried out using NATO weapons and NATO intelligence.
Down But Not Out
Despite recent setbacks, the Black Sea Fleet remains an active fighting force. Satellite and ship tracking sites reveal that the Black Sea Fleet still routinely operates in the Black Sea and Sevastopol.
While less frequent, the fleet still participates in large-scale missile attacks against inland Ukrainian sites and infrastructure.
Most recently, the Black Sea Fleet took part in repelling a massive Ukrainian drone attack, which by some accounts used more than 500 unmanned vehicles of all types. The attack reportedly resulted in the loss of a Russian Su-30SM fighter jet, although no damage was reported anywhere else.
From Russian Navy. Helicopter of Russian cruiser Marshal Ustinov (Russian: Маршал Устинов) Marshal Ustinov is a Slava-class cruiser laid down in 1978, launched in April 1982 and commissioned in 1986. The Russian name for the ship type is Gvardeysky Raketnyy Kreyser (GRKR), meaning “Guards Missile Cruiser”. She is named after Dmitriy Ustinov, a former Soviet Minister of Defence. Designed as a battle cruiser, the Slava Class is smaller and less expensive than other ships, which demonstrate similar capabilities. The design integrates the P-500 Bazalt missile, which is a conventional alternative to the missiles installed in the Kirov Class battle cruiser. A crane is installed on the ship (visible between the two smoke stacks) for handling boats, while anti-ship missiles fitted on either side of the superstructure provide it with a typical appearance. The vessels have poor damage control capabilities due to flammable materials used in the structure.
Image of President Putin reviewing a Russian Navy submarine.
A Russian Federation Navy Ropuchhka II amphibious assault ship lies at anchor near Vladivostok, Russia, on Aug. 16, 1996, as the ship readies for Exercise Cooperation From the Sea ’96. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units of the 7th Fleet and Russian Federation Navy units are conducting the exercise near the port city of Vladivostok. The purpose of the exercise is to improve interoperability with Russian military forces in conducting disaster relief and humanitarian missions. Personnel exchanges and training will promote cooperation and understanding between the U.S. and Russian Federation Naval Forces. DoD photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jeffrey Viano, U.S. Navy.
Ukraine’s operations in the Black Sea have definitely hindered Russia’s Naval capabilities, but the Black Sea Fleet is not inactive as some reports have erroneously concluded. As the war has gone on, Russia has adjusted its tactics and strategies to protect itself against Ukraine’s asymmetric operations.
However, for a navy the size of Russia’s these set backs are surprising and quite frankly inexcusable.
About the Author: Isaac Seitz
Isaac Seitz, a 19FortyFive Defense Columnist, graduated from Patrick Henry College’s Strategic Intelligence and National Security program. He has also studied Russian at Middlebury Language Schools and has worked as an intelligence Analyst in the private sector.
