Key Points and Summary – Dr. Arkady Moshes argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine has exposed a glaring reality: Moscow has neither a viable victory strategy nor an exit plan.
-Putin, more judoka than chess player, bet on a quick collapse of Kyiv and decades of Western concessions.
-Instead, Ukraine’s resistance and Europe’s unexpected resolve have left the Kremlin trapped in a grinding conflict it cannot convincingly justify at home or abroad.
-Moshes traces how earlier European appeasement taught Moscow to expect another compromise at Ukraine’s expense—and why that pattern has finally broken, creating a narrow but critical window for a tougher Western Russia policy.
How Decades of Western Concessions Helped Lead to Putin’s Ukraine Trap
In recent months, it has become increasingly apparent that Russia has neither a victory strategy nor an exit plan regarding the war in Ukraine that it launched in February 2022.
Of course, one may wonder if it has ever had one. Indeed, if the calculus were to defeat and conquer the neighboring country “in three days”, as the narrative goes, such calculus would not have had to be based on long-term strategizing.
After all, Vladimir Putin is not a chess player. He is a judoka. Unlike chess masters, who, to win, must elaborate complicated combinations, judokas, on the contrary, are trained to wait for and then exploit mistakes of their opponents. This is a totally different philosophy.
Furthermore, Putin is believed not to be risk-averse. On the contrary, he might instead appreciate a statement ascribed to Napoleon I: “On s´engage, et puis on voit”, which can be loosely translated as “Let’s start the battle, and then we will see”.
In other words, while the Russian president is always ready to seize opportunities when they emerge, he has much less interest in preparing detailed “marching orders” and instructions for what would have to be done depending on the circumstances.
That said, since his rise to power in Russia a quarter of a century ago, Putin has had a clear vision of the final objectives of his policy regarding Ukraine, the European security system, and the West more generally. First, the Russian leader wanted the latter to discontinue democracy promotion within Russia. Second, he sought to re-establish an exclusive sphere of influence in the part of the post-Soviet space that lies immediately westward of Russia´s borders. Third, he aimed to revise the endgame of the Cold War and, once again, make Russia a veto player on continental security matters. In turn, if the West agreed, the Kremlin was ready to provide economic incentives to “friendly” businesses and states.
The mid-2000s accomplished the first task. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the deployment of the US troops in Afghanistan, Washington was seeking an ad hoc security partnership with Russia, however limited.
In contrast, Europe was motivated by the promise of economic opportunities. As a result, both relinquished a value-based approach to Russia.
The second objective was within reach. Without the Ukrainians’ commitment to freedom demonstrated during the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity of 2014, and even more so, without people’s resolve to defend Ukraine’s future as a full-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community, Russia’s sphere of influence would have had a good chance to be built and tacitly recognized by the West.
A complete revision of Russia’s status in the European security system would be the most challenging goal to achieve. Still, Moscow’s partial success was and remains undeniable: in 2021, on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, post-Soviet states aspiring to join the EU and especially NATO were as far away from acceding to these organizations as they were in 2004 or 1994.
The Signal Problem
Europe, which is particularly regrettable, kept sending signals that could only encourage Moscow’s assertiveness. After the Russia-Georgia armed conflict of 2008, Brussels proceeded with developing a “strategic partnership” with Russia. In February 2014, at the critical moment of the Revolution of Dignity, European mediators were negotiating a mechanism that would allow Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, whose refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU had provoked the popular uprising, to remain in power at least until the next elections. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Berlin doubled down on completing the Nord Stream 2 project, which would further increase Germany’s energy dependence on Russia. A year later, German and French leaders Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, in fact, rewarded Moscow for violating the previous deal between its Donbas proxies and Ukraine, called Minsk I.
They agreed to pretend that Russia was not part of the problem and helped Vladimir Putin impose the stillborn Minsk II agreement on Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, which Kyiv could not implement without risking the total collapse of Ukraine’s statehood.
Decades of concessions in Europe’s approach to Russia taught Moscow to assume that, whatever the rhetoric, sooner or later Europe would seek a compromise – especially if this would be a compromise at Ukraine’s expense. As a result, in 2022, the Kremlin was taken totally by surprise by Europe’s support of Ukraine, economic damage notwithstanding, and did not have a plan “B”. It could only count on Vladimir Putin’s remaining in power longer than the key current European leaders and finding a common language with their successors, who may come to power on the wave of popular fatigue with spending money on assisting Ukraine.
The re-election of Donald Trump as the US president gave Putin a lottery ticket. But unlike a real lottery, in this case, sitting and waiting for the win would be the wrong tactic. Instead of trying to persuade Trump to admit that all of Russia’s demands are “legitimate” and proposing he trade Russia’s geopolitical gains for economic projects, it could have been much more productive to offer something that would emphasize his undisputed leadership within the West, if not globally, while stepping at least a bit backwards on the Ukraine question.
That did not happen. Today, after Trump publicly expressed his disappointment with Putin and, more importantly, secured Europe’s consent to pay for the American weapons that would be sent to Ukraine, that lottery ticket may have expired.
What Happens Now?
Russia still has resources to continue its war in Ukraine. But Kremlin attempts to explain to both international and domestic audiences why this war should go on until all Russia’s demands are accepted become less and less convincing. This creates a window of opportunity, at least in the diplomatic and economic spheres, for Western actors to pursue a more effective policy vis-à-vis Russia. These opportunities should not be missed.
About the Author: Arkady Moshes
Arkady Moshes serves as Program Director, Research Program on Russia, EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia, at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki.
