Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy is currently facing a severe shipbuilding crisis described as a “doom loop,” characterized by 82% of construction projects running behind schedule and a shrinking fleet despite a doubled budget over the last two decades.
-This industrial failure severely hampers U.S. readiness against China, which now possesses the world’s largest navy and is preparing for potential conflict by 2027.
-High-profile disasters include the cancellation of four Constellation-class frigates due to design creep, the operational failure of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and the reduction of the Zumwalt-class destroyer fleet from 32 ships to just three.
-With a “fading” industrial base and critical workforce shortages, the Navy is struggling to meet its goal of 381 manned ships, forcing it to consider relying on allies like Japan and South Korea for future production.
The “Doom Loop”: Why the U.S. Navy Fleet Is Shrinking
The U.S. Navy is currently facing a significant shipbuilding crisis, characterized by major programs running severely over budget, behind schedule, and some being cancelled or scaled back, with roughly 82 percent of ships under construction behind schedule.
Littoral Combat Ship USS Cooperstown. Image Credit: 19FortyFive.com
Littoral Combat Ship Deck Gun U.S. Navy. Image Credit: 19FortyFive.com
Despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget over the last 2 decades, the number of ships in the U.S. Navy has decreased. The Navy and Department of Defense work with private companies to build ships and have invested billions of dollars to support the shipbuilding industrial base.
But even with this investment, the industry has not met the Navy’s goals—jeopardizing the Navy’s ability to protect the U.S. from growing maritime threats and competition.
This “doom loop” of production delays, maintenance backlogs, and workforce issues has resulted in a shrinking fleet despite nearly doubling the shipbuilding budget over the last two decades.
This puts the Navy in a bad spot to rebuild its force for modern warfare against near-peer adversaries like China and Russia.
Shipbuilding Infrastructure In The US Is In Poor Condition:
It is a complex issue with various perspectives and challenges, some of which the Navy has no control over. The shipbuilding industry in the United States is one of the cornerstones of the nation’s security and economic resilience.
However, global shifts in industry and supply chain trends threaten its competitiveness and ability to meet growing demands. And the US government allowed its shipbuilding industry to fade on the vine.
US Navy Littoral Combat Ship. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
170623-N-PD309-122 BOHOL SEA (June 23, 2017) Littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) transits the Bohol Sea during an exercise with the Philippine Navy for Maritime Training Activity (MTA) Sama Sama 2017. MTA Sama Sama is a bilateral maritime exercise between U.S. and Philippine naval forces and is designed to strengthen cooperation and interoperability between the nations’ armed forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Deven Leigh Ellis/Released)
However, the shipbuilding industry has its strengths and benefits from public sector initiatives aimed at revitalizing its infrastructure and workforce.
It does need a shot in the arm to improve its fading infrastructure and to create new jobs to bring the skilled workers needed back to the industry.
The Navy and the Department of Defense are taking steps to help private companies with shipbuilding. For example, they’ve invested billions to help increase shipbuilding capacity, such as helping with infrastructure improvements at shipyards and workforce development, according to the GAO’s Shelby Oakley.
China’s Navy Has Advantages In Ships:
The Chinese have invested heavily in their Navy (PLAN) and Coast Guard. Currently, their navy is concentrating on the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the First and Second Island Chains.
The PLAN has surpassed the US Navy in the total number of ships, including both surface combatants and submarines. They have the world’s largest navy by ship count.
And while the US Navy has fewer ships overall, it possesses a larger tonnage of ships and a greater number of larger, more capable vessels.
The Chinese Navy and Coast Guard have harassed smaller nations’ ships and belligerently seized small islands that they claim and have stationed bases there. They are growing impatient about reuniting with Taiwan, and have told their military to be ready to go to war in 2027, presumably to take Taiwan.
That would most certainly entail a war with the United States. China has the long-range missiles to attack US bases in Guam. the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
Would the US Navy, split between the Atlantic and Pacific, have enough sea and air power to thwart a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and all that it would entail?
Currently, the Navy lacks sufficient capacity to meet both its worldwide presence and crisis response requirements. One factor to keep in mind is that if China attacks the US and Japan and South Korea join the US, then China’s numerical advantage is rendered moot.
Taiwan is so close to mainland China that it can afford to keep its one main aircraft carrier and two smaller ones close to shore and still engage US carriers.
The Navy’s Plans For 2025-2026 And Beyond:
The Navy has a clear goal: its 2026 plan aims for a larger fleet (381 manned ships and 134 unmanned vessels) with more distributed firepower. To achieve its goal of 381 battle force ships, the Navy would buy 364 vessels over the next 30 years—293 combat ships and 71 combat logistics and support vessels.
Significant investment is underway in shipbuilding, with the budget nearly doubling over the past two decades.
A focus on advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber resilience, and unmanned systems, is intended to enhance capabilities and accelerate modernization.
The Navy is working to streamline acquisition processes and to integrate commercially available technologies more quickly. But the failure of designs and the Navy’s insistence on entering production while designs are not finalized or completely tested has been wasteful and expensive.
Major Overbudget and Cancelled Programs:
Constellation-Class Frigate (FFG-62)- In November 2025, the Navy announced the cancellation of four out of six contracted frigates, with only the first two (USS Constellation and USS Congress) to be completed.
Based on the Italian FREMM design, the program was meant to be a low-risk, “off-the-shelf” design, but became plagued by design creep and weight issues, and, as of late 2025, was considered 80 percent of the cost of a destroyer with only 60 percent of the capability.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – Initially estimated at $220 million per hull, costs for these ships ballooned to over $600 million each. The program was significantly scaled back, with several ships retired early due to mechanical issues and mission failures.
The US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program failed due to technical issues such as propulsion problems, underestimated complexity, immature mission systems, and a lack of survivability against high-end threats, leading to premature retirements and a shift towards more traditional frigates like the Constellation class.
The initial vision of cheap, adaptable, multi-mission ships for near-shore fighting didn’t materialize, resulting in a fleet that struggled with maintenance, lacked adequate armament, and couldn’t meet evolving strategic needs, especially against peer competitors like China.
Early models suffered from hull cracks, weak propulsion systems (limiting speed), and ongoing mechanical issues, making them expensive to maintain and operate.
The modular mission packages (for anti-submarine, mine warfare, etc.) were often delayed, underdeveloped, or failed testing, hindering the ships’ intended versatility.
The lack of survivability was also a big factor. The ships proved vulnerable in combat, lacking the armor and defensive capabilities needed for modern warfare against sophisticated adversaries, making them ill-suited for high-intensity conflicts.
The Navy struggled to define the LCS’s role, leading to a lack of focus and a ship that didn’t fully meet any single critical need effectively.
Zumwalt-Class Destroyer (DDG-1000) – The Zumwalt destroyer program failed due to massive cost overruns, rendering its key weapons systems economically unviable, leading to the fleet being cut from 32 ships to just three; its advanced features, like stealth, couldn’t justify the exorbitant price tag (around $8 billion per ship) when compared to the cheaper, more versatile Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, forcing the Navy to repurpose the remaining ships for new roles like carrying hypersonic missiles.
Prohibitive costs were a major factor in its failure. The initial plan for 32 ships was slashed to three, concentrating the massive development costs onto fewer vessels, making each cost roughly the price of an aircraft carrier (around $7.5-$8 billion).
The intended main armament, powerful 155mm guns for long-range bombardment, became useless because the specialized, precision-guided ammunition cost $800,000 to $1 million per round, making it impractical for the Navy to buy.
Zumwalt-Class Destroyer U.S. Navy.
Zumwalt-Class Destroyer U.S. Navy. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The Navy’s strategic needs changed, and the expensive, technologically complex Zumwalts couldn’t match the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of the modernized Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
Concurrent development issues plagued the program. Developing numerous new technologies simultaneously (like its stealth hull and electric propulsion) led to unforeseen problems and increased costs.
Despite advanced stealth, the ships had fewer missile cells than expected and struggled to operate effectively in large task forces or near shore, conflicting with their intended roles..
Cruiser Modernization – The U.S. Navy’s cruiser modernization program faced major issues, including poor planning, weak oversight, and contractor failures, leading to billions in wasted funds, significant delays, and ships being retired before completing upgrades.
Problems stemmed from a lack of acquisition strategy, muddled command, poor quality work (using unauthorized materials like superglue), and insufficient accountability for contractors, resulting in massive cost overruns and ships never returning to service as intended.
A GAO report found the Navy “wasted” $1.84 billion on efforts to modernize Ticonderoga-class cruisers, with four ships being decommissioned before completing repairs.
The practice of starting production before design completion, which one official called “malpractice.” Overly complex designs, including trying to cram too many systems into new ships.
The Navy’s Current Status In 2026:
The US Navy is struggling with a shrinking fleet, with only 290 deployable ships expected by 2025, below the initial 313 goal.
Navy leadership has termed current shipbuilding “a mess”.
Two Los Angeles-class submarines (USS Newport News and USS Alexandria) are slated for decommissioning in 2026.
Future focus is shifting towards new, faster-delivered, and more affordable ship classes.
Other Concerns and Challenges:
Weak shipbuilding industrial base: The US shipbuilding capacity has significantly declined since the Cold War, struggling with workforce shortages, aging infrastructure, and a reliance on a limited number of specialized yards.
Shipbuilding programs are consistently over budget and behind schedule, with some ships facing delays of up to three years.
Collaboration with allies like Japan and South Korea could help address shipbuilding challenges.
With the US building larger ships and its shipyards geared toward them, Japan and South Korea could take up the mantle of building smaller vessels, such as corvettes and frigates.
The Navy is reportedly 20 years behind schedule in maintaining its existing fleet, which could lead to the potential decommissioning of viable ships. That is unacceptable.
The Navy’s fleet is projected to decrease in size over the next few years before eventually growing, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
The 2025 shipbuilding plan is estimated to cost significantly more than previous plans, requiring a substantial increase in the Navy’s overall budget.
The Navy’s ability to deter and respond to threats effectively is questioned, with concerns about its readiness for sustained combat operations against near-peer adversaries, notes the War on the Rocks website.
There are concerns about the Navy’s capacity to repair ships damaged in combat, which would be crucial in a conflict with a near-peer adversary.
The US Navy is actively working to rebuild and modernize its force for modern warfare, with ambitious goals and significant investments in technology.
However, significant challenges remain in shipbuilding capacity, workforce, costs, and maintenance that have slowed shipbuilding to a crawl. The new Trump-class battleship seems like another design that is destined to fail.
To get the Navy back on track with shipbuilding, a multi-faceted approach is needed, focusing on stable, long-term funding (like multi-year buys), streamlining design and acquisition processes (reducing design creep), investing heavily in the industrial base (workforce, infrastructure, automation), and leveraging allied capabilities, while Congress provides consistent demand signals.
The success of the Navy’s rebuilding efforts will likely depend on its ability to overcome these challenges and effectively adapt to the evolving geopolitical landscape and technological advancements.
About the Author: Stephen Balestrieri
Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.
