Key Points and Summary – Russia’s Su-57 Felon was billed as a true fifth-generation rival to the F-22, F-35, and China’s J-20.
-Instead, it has become a low-volume, high-hype program.
Su-57 Felon Fighter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
-Chronic production bottlenecks, sanctions, engine delays, and questionable stealth features mean fewer than 20 serial jets likely exist, all flying with a stopgap fourth-generation powerplant.
-In Ukraine, the Su-57 has been used cautiously as a standoff missile truck, not a true air-dominance fighter.
-Export hopes have largely fizzled after India walked away and only Algeria signed on. On current trends, the Su-57 looks destined to remain a niche, strategically marginal platform.
Is Russia’s Su-57 Felon Fifth-Gen Fighter Already a Failed Program?
The Su-57 Felon was supposed to be Russia’s flagship fifth-generation fighter, a direct competitor with the US F-22 and F-35 and China’s J-20.
But despite making a first flight fifteen years ago, only a handful of Su-57s have entered servic,e while only Algeria has made an export purchase, raising the question: is the Su-57 a failed program?
High Expectations for Su-57
The Su-57 was envisioned as a stealth air superiority fighter with strike and sensor-fusion capabilities.
Russia marketed the aircraft as the answer to American fifth-generation fighters, jammed with cutting-edge tech, including super cruise, advanced avionics, all-aspect stealth, networked barware integration, and new Izdeliye 30 engines.
The Su-57 was billed as the future anchor of Russian air power, the heir apparent to older Su-27 and MiG-29 platforms.
But production problems, chronic since the Soviet collapse and only exacerbated since the levying of intensive post-Ukraine sanctions, made initial plans, for 76 airframes before 2028, an impossibility.
Su-57. Image Credit – Creative Commons.
The current production rate is for 2 to 4 airframes per year; fewer than 20 serial aircraft are believed to exist.
By comparison, the US produced over 150 F-35s per year while China produces over 50 J-20s per year. And aside from a lethargic production tempo, the first serial production Su-57 crashed in 2019, suggesting quality-control issues.
Su-57 Felon: Not Really a Stealth Fighter?
The simple truth, revealed since the Su-57’s first flight, is that Russia lacks the industrial base to manufacture a fifth-generation fighter at scale.
The Su-57 has suffered from engine development delays; the airframe was supposed to include the promised Izdeliye 30 fifth-generation-worthy engine.
But the new engine has only been tested to a limited extent, with an unclear production timeline, and delays are expected to persist into the 2030s.
So instead, the Su-57 has been dependent upon the AL-41F1 engine, a fourth-generation power plant.
Without the updated engines, the Felon lacks hallmark fifth-generation features such as reliable supercruise, reduced thermal signature, improved thrust-to-weight, and the fuel efficiency needed for long-range missions.
The core requirements of being a fifth-generation fighter remain unfulfilled. Some would even argue this is not even a true stealth fighter.
AL-41F1 engine compressor stall at MAKS-2011.
And as modern aircraft pivot aggressively towards stealth, the Felon is believed to have significant observability shortcomings.
OSINT analysis shows design flaws that likely raise the Su-57’s observability, notably higher than Western counterparts, including: round, non-shielded engine nozzles, non-serpentine inlet design, numerous panel edges and rivet exposure, inconsistent radar-absorbent materials, and the placement of external L-band radars on leading edges.
Su-57 deployment in Ukraine has been telling; Russia has used its hallmark fighter only sparingly in Ukraine, firing standoff missiles from Russian airspace and avoiding contested airspace entirely.
Why? Because production has been so limited, Russia must treat its few Su-57s preciously.
Russia has too few Felons to risk operationally, while the political cost of a single loss would likely be too high to justify proper deployment. Functionally, Russia has used the Su-57 as a standoff missile launch platform, a mission that any fourth-generation Su-35 could perform.
Russian Su-57 and Su-57 Stealth Fighters. Image Credit: Russian Government.
Russia had aggressively marketed the fighter abroad, hoping to offer the global market an alternative to the American F-35.
But export efforts have mostly failed. India withdrew from a co-development program, citing poor stealth and unreliable manufacturing.
Beyond Algeria, the platform has generated zero interest from MENA or Asian customers. And while Algeria has placed an order for 14 airframes, this is not a significant success, unlikely to change the program’s trajectory.
Compared to the F-35’s export rate, the fighter is functionally irrelevant.
Strategically, the fighter program is limited. In such small numbers, likely under 20, the platform simply doesn’t exist in quantity to make a meaningful strategic impact.
The platform does not enhance Russia’s deterrence posture, and does not appear to be situated to ever serve as a backbone fighter.
In head-to-head competition with American fifth-generation fighters, the Su-57 has fallen well behind in both technology and export success.
Could Russia turn the Felon program around?
Doing so would require a massive increase in production capacity, which seems unlikely given the existing industrial infrastructure and existing international sanctions.
Incorporating the Izdeliye-30 engine would help, but for now, the Felon program seems destined for low-volume production and a limited export footprint.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is an attorney and journalist covering national security, technology, and politics. Previously, he was a political staffer, candidate, and a US Air Force pilot select. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in global journalism and international relations from NYU.
