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Matthew Bryant

On the campaign trail, President Donald Trump often promised that he could have a peace agreement with Russia “In one day.” This braggadocious optimism may find itself smacking up against the intransigence of Russian diplomats, battlefield gains, and an unwillingness to make peace on Washington’s terms. Whether Trump can forge a quick and lasting peace in the next few months will, in large part, be determined if he can put to bed not just the bad feelings from his first term but also nearly three decades of worsening US-Russia relations. Trump and Russia: What Happens Now? In the minds of many Americans, Trump is friendly with Russia. This familiar aphorism is much milder today than during the first Trump presidency when many were convinced that Russians had some degree of compromising information on Trump. This belief was started mainly by the partisans and the now-discredited Steele Dossier. The document alleged Russian collusion and blackmail over Trump. This document made allegations and wild claims of Russian collusion and blackmail over Trump. The dubious nature of the document was not known at the time when it first exploded into the media landscape. By the time the document's origins became better known, the damage had already been done. Donald Trump was domestically tied to his ability to seek a rapprochement with Moscow lest he “give Putin a win.” In Moscow, Trump's first victory was met with open celebration by some within the Russian government. The loud and often Trumplike figure Vladimir Zhirinovsky even hosted a banquet in honor of the president-elect. Putin likely hoped that Trump could give the Russians what they wanted, someone who could make a settlement with Russia similar to the Nixonian Detente with the Soviet Union. This acceptance of Trump can only really be said to be relative in that the Obama-Putin relationship was characterized by an increasingly tense and, at times, openly hostile relationship. An Op-Ed by Dmitri Trenen gives a detailed accounting of US-Russia Relations during Trump's first administration. He details how the Trump administration found itself completely hamstrung in its negotiations with Russia. While Trump himself may have personally been in favor of having a better working relationship with Putin, the US Congress, and various other forces within the United States had different plans. Several attempts were made to meet Putin to hammer out a better relationship. The G20 summit in 2017, Helsinki in 2018, and a failure to meet in Argentina later in 2018 sealed the end of these attempts. In each of these meetings, Trump was dogged by the constant allegations of collusion. Under these conditions of high scrutiny, it would be nearly impossible for any president, regardless of his diplomatic stature, to sit down for the kind of necessary, profound negotiation needed to fix the US-Russia relationship. From this history, it is safe to say that, at the very least, the Trump-Putin relationship is complicated. On numerous occasions, Putin said he prefers Democratic candidates (Biden and Harris) over Trump. While this might be a classic case of Russian maskirovka, it might also hint at a resigned belief that the Trump presidency might be just as bad for the Russians as a Biden-Harris administration. At least with the Biden-Harris administration, there is not the same level of unpredictability that Donald Trump brings to international relations. As with most negotiations, it is always a matter of leverage. In theory, Trump is walking into the White House with a lot of opportunity to give Russia back a great many things. However, success on Trump's end runs up against a congressional wall. Many of the sanctions leveled against the Russian government would need a congressional commitment, and many in Congress are committed to a Russian defeat. Lindsey Graham, for example, referred to the funding of Ukrainian resistance as the best money the US has ever spent. This congressional block may be something that Trump can overcome, however. Some suggest that even Lindsey Graham is bending towards Trump's less interventionist style of diplomacy. On the Joe Rogan podcast in October, Trump alluded to “things he said to Putin,” which may or may not have persuaded the president not to invade Ukraine during his term. Trump is well aware of the strategy of escalating to de-escalate. He used this to great effect with North Korea, one moment he was comparing button sizes with Kim Jong Un, and the next he was smiling and shaking hands across the border with him. Though this made for a great photo-op, it didn’t mark any significant tangible change in the relationship between Pyongyang and Washington. It must also be remembered that North Korea is not Russia, and if Trump is seeking to threaten Putin into compliance, backing up said threat may cost more than a few spicy tweets. Trump's advisors do not offer much optimism that they understand Russia’s non-negotiables, or are even willing to admit that they are negotiating from a position of relative disadvantage. For example, Marco Rubio stated that Ukraine and Russia must be willing to make concessions. This idea might be all well and good on the floor of the Senate, but the Russians are not likely to move an inch on their red lines, much less give concessions when they know they are in a better position to outlast Ukraine. Trump's Special Envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, has a similarly rosy view of the US’s ability to negotiate peace. His plan includes a ‘hold’ on Ukraine's membership in NATO. What this means is ambiguous and flies in the face of Russia’s emphatic insistence that anything other than Ukraine's strict neutrality is unacceptable. The likely outcome of peace talks in the near future appears grim. The situation is too complex for Trump to swing his sword through this Gordian knot. Trump will only succeed in this negotiation if he is willing to meet on Moscow’s terms. This is because, at the moment, Trump does not have ready leverage that he can use to woo Putin to the negotiating table on an equal footing. The Russian army is winning on the battlefield and its economy has remained resilient in the face of Western sanctions. Whether or not this will hold in the long run for Russia’s economy remains to be seen. The Russians remain adamant that Ukraine's NATO future is a red line. In the face of such incompatible goals for peace, it might be a very long time before Trump can deliver on this particular campaign promise. Matthew Bryant received his bachelor's in Global Affairs with a concentration in Russian and Eurasian Studies from George Mason University. He completed his Masters Degree at the Higher School of Economics in Saint Petersburg where he studied Comparative Politics of Eurasia. His work has been featured in Law and Liberty, The Realist Review, and the National Interest. He researches and writes about the post-Soviet area as well as US-Russia relations. You can follow him on Twitter @Realmofmatt

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