Europe Has a Big Defense Call to Make: The Trump administration’s apparent desire to cut Ukraine loose and terminate NATO’s proxy war against Russia is creating a veritable chasm between U.S. foreign policy goals and those of its European allies.
With the exceptions of the rightwing governments in Hungary and Georgia, the shift of Washington’s position regarding the Ukraine-Russia conflict has produced vehement condemnations in European capitals.
Pro-Ukraine governments seem intent on impeding, if not sabotaging, Trump’s campaign to pressure Kyiv into signing a peace accord that makes concessions to Moscow.
Not only have European leaders condemned major features of Washington’s new foreign policy, especially with respect to Ukraine, they are giving serious consideration to developing a robust, independent military capability for the European Union.
Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has proposed a plan to “re-arm Europe” by boosting EU defense spending to approximately $840 billion. At that point, EU military spending would be nearly as large as Washington’s annual outlays. Adding Non-EU member Britain’s spending would narrow that gap even more.
Europe’s Massive Spending Package: A Bad Idea?
However, it remains to be seem if there is any real substance to the spending proposals that von der Leyen and other hardliners are pushing.
There is considerable self-congratulations within NATO’s elites that a majority of member states have now fulfilled their promise to spend at least 2 percent of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense.
But even that modest goal was finally achieved in 2024—nearly two decades after the initial promises. Moreover, despite the constantly rising tensions with Russia, nearly half of NATO’s members have yet to reach the 2 percent target.
A very large gap still exists between the 2 percent level and von der Leyen’s wildly ambitious goal of spending $840 billion.
Such a boost in military spending is not likely to be popular among rank-and-file voters in European countries. By providing for so many crucial aspects of Europe’s defense needs, the United States has effectively subsidized the generous welfare states that its NATO allies have maintained over the decades.
What happens if that subsidy comes to an end, and EU members must bear the full costs of their defense—or more accurately, their military and geostrategic ambitions?
It is quite possible that the political elites in the EU countries are planning increased military outlays that their publics will not support, especially if that change means slashing their welfare states or watching government borrowing costs soar.
The Nuclear Weapons Issue
Yet another crucial consideration that has undermined previous European musings about developing an independent foreign policy is the near total dependence on the United States for extended nuclear deterrence.
The small British and French nuclear arsenals might seem sufficient for primary deterrence—discouraging a direct attack on either of those countries. But it was decidedly uncertain whether such small arsenals would be a credible extended deterrent—preventing an attack on Europe’s other democratic, non-nuclear nations.
Even when France and Britain were both members of the EU, there were inherent doubts regarding that issue.
When Britain approved Brexit and left the EU, even greater doubts emerged.
However, there now appears to be some new thinking about the nuclear issue as well. French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed a willingness to consider explicitly extending his country’s nuclear deterrent to cover France’s neighbors—a step that would reduce, if not eliminate, democratic Europe’s longstanding reliance on the vast U.S. strategic arsenal. Only time will tell, though, if the current talk amounts to any real substance.
Europe to Declare Defense Independence from United States?
Finally, European publics and their political leaders need to ask themselves if a major boost in military spending is necessary or even prudent just because they decide on greater policy independence from the United States.
Recognizing that the vital interests of Europe and the United States are not congruent is a realization that is long overdue. One wishes that the separation could be an amicable one instead of the ongoing split that is taking place amidst a tsunami of anger and vitriol.
But however it occurs, European leaders need to decide if they wish to continue an uncompromising belligerent foreign policy toward Russia. The “Hitler analogy” has poisoned both U.S. and European policy for more than three generations. It has produced an approach to world affairs that is a toxic mixture of paranoia and moral crusading. If an independent Europe continues down that path, the results are likely to be unpleasant indeed.
At best, democratic Europe will become less and less democratic until it is an armed camp, always worried about an imminent war with Russia, and seeing that country as nothing more than an updated version of Nazi Germany. At worst, an increasingly paranoid Europe achieves a self-fulfilling prophecy of an enormously destructive war with Moscow.
Typhoon fitted with the common launcher (computer generated image: for illustrative purposes only)
There is another option if democratic Europe can overcome its obsession with viewing today’s Russia as nothing more than the reincarnation of Nazi Germany. Embracing that more rational approach would enable the EU to pursue a new foreign policy that is both independent of the United States and firmly non-belligerent. Such a defense policy would require only a modest increase in military spending to fill some gaps in capabilities and better coordinate the national military forces of the member states.
Even more important, the EU could become a center for creative diplomacy to mediate and reduce conflicts, rather than a belligerent player adding to tensions and conflict in the world.
About the Author: Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter
Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and a contributing editor at 19FortyFive. He is the author of 13 books and more than 1,300 articles on national security, international affairs, and civil liberties. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).
