The True Story Behind Donald Trump’s Stance on NATO and Ukraine

Why Trump’s Ukraine Policy Actually Strengthens NATO

President Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy is doing the opposite of what many think – it is strengthening NATO and investing America in Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity. But it is doing so in a way that is realistic and is intended actually to work rather than sound nice.

One clear aspect of President Trump’s foreign policy is that there is a difference between alliances and free ridership. President Trump is not seeking to undo the longstanding international relationships the U.S. has around the world, which are based on strategic, historic and moral underpinnings.

For examples, he sees China as the enemy, Taiwan as the ally. Unlike his recent Democratic predecessors, he’s not looking to flip the script, making grand and worthless agreements with enemies like Iran while creating “daylight” between Washington and Jerusalem.

At the same time, he believes allies must contribute meaningfully to the alliance. The European Commission pledged to raise the area’s military spending by nearly $200 billion a year in the aftermath of supposedly disastrous meeting between Presidents Trump and Zelensky. This demonstrates that the meeting was a great success for the perspective of what the U.S. has been trying to do for years – get the EU to take its own defense seriously.

Since his first term, President Trump has been begging that NATO members exceed or at least consistently meet the 2% GDP minimum expenditure demanded by the alliance’s own rules. In just the past few days, Germany has made plans for hundreds of billions of dollars in additional defense spending in coming years. Britain will raise defense spending to 2.5% of the budget in 2017, funded by reductions in international aid programs, and other European allies are following suit.

Europe’s adoption of Trump’s agenda would normally be depicted as a strengthening of the Atlantic alliance, which indeed it is. The situation could not last where the U.S. was the principal backstop for Europe’s regional defense while the continent allowed itself to be invaded by migrants, spend vast amounts on social programs, and an ever-stronger Brussels bureaucracy.

The steps Europe is taking now will put the alliance with the U.S. on firmer footing, but this good news is being obscured by laments about Trump’s abandonment of allies. NATO and Europe have not been abandoned, but shocked to their senses by the president’s brash manner. But they simply did not get the message when it was delivered in calmer tones.

Indeed, recent events show that the U.S. takes the NATO alliance extremely seriously. Zelensky’s main demands in diplomatic negotiations are not from Russia, but from the West, which he rightly predicts to be more accommodating. NATO membership or some other kind of “security guarantees” have become his holy grail. The NATO bid was always a non-starter. But Trump’s annoyance at the demand shows that he believes the U.S. should make only defense promises that it plans to honor – and the NATO Charter is foremost among them.

In this light, Zelenksy’s insistence on “security guarantees” and initial reluctance to enter a mineral deal is puzzling. It suggests an elevation of form over substance. Security guarantees are worthless unless enforced by the guarantor. Unless the latter has real independent incentives and national interest in providing such support when it’s needed, it won’t be provided.

Kiev should know this best of all: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum committed it to nuclear disarmament in exchange from security assurances from Washington, London – and Moscow. That didn’t prevent Russia from invading in 2014 or again in 2022, though it certainly did lead Presidents Obama and Biden to actually honor the guarantees.

Ukraine’s experience is far from unique. Cyprus was supposed to be protected by something literally called the Treaty of Guarantee, in which the UK, Greece, and Turkey pledged to ensure the island’s independence, territorial integrity, and security. Instead, Anakara invaded and conquered the northern third of the island in 1974, while Britain lodged diplomatic protests. That occupation continues to the present day.

A Royal Danish Army Leopard 2 tank fires at a target during a live-fire exercise at the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 04, 2014. The 7th Army JMTC provides dynamic training, preparing forces to execute Unified Land Operations and contingencies in support of the Combatant Commands, NATO, and other national requirements.
(U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Markus Rauchenberger/released),

Or take America’s close ally Israel. As Israel contemplated completely withdrawing its troops and civilians from Gaza, President George W. Bush had an exchange of letters with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In the so-called “Bush-Sharon Correspondence,” America expressed promised a “steadfast commitment to Israel’s security, including secure, defensible borders.”

This was at the time portrayed as a major commitment and diplomatic win for the Jewish State. They lost strategic territory in Gaza but won American protection. Yet when President Barack Obama took office, he fully disclaimed the letters, and insisted they do not obligate the U.S. Needless to say, Gaza went on to fundamentally undermine Israel’s security, and President Biden demanded that Israel cease military operations far short of victory.

Trump understands that paper promises are worthless and suggested a new approach to cementing alliances – by creating real joint interests. The mineral deal between the two countries makes the U.S. directly invested in Ukraine’s territorial integrity, an interest that will exist across administrations.

About the Author: Eugene Kontorovich

Professor of Law Eugene Kontorovich is one of the world’s preeminent experts on universal jurisdiction and maritime piracy, as well as international law and the Israel-Arab conflict. He is also the Executive Director of Scalia Law School’s Center for the Middle East and International Law. Professor Kontorovich joined the Scalia Law School from Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law where he was a Professor of Law from 2011 to 2018 and an Associate Professor from 2007 to 2011. Previously, he was a Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago from 2005 to 2007 and an Assistant Professor at George Mason School of Law from 2003 to 2007. Professor Konotorovich is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.