Can Donald Trump Pull Off a ‘Reverse Kissinger’ with Russia and China? – Throughout the Ukraine War, US President Donald Trump and his ‘Make America Great Again’ political movement have exhibited a notable sympathy for the Russian position in the conflict.
MAGA pundits have proffered a number of strategic reasons why the US should facilitate a peace on terms favorable to the Russians. All of these are contestable.
But the most coherent to date is the emerging notion that Russia might be an ally against China.
This argument retains the most disturbing element of other MAGA argumentation – an uncomfortable willingness to let Russia win the war, or at least to slice off a significant chunk of eastern Ukraine.
US acceptance of Russian territorial aggrandizement would stand in sharp contrast to US behavior throughout the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. Facilitating a Russian victory would also likely cause a major breach inside NATO.
But there is a logic which the Trump administration seems to be groping for – that China is the greatest challenge to the US for decades to come (true) and that breaking the Russian-Chinese alliance which has emerged in recent years is a major US national interest (also true).
This move has been referred to as a ‘reverse Kissinger’ in reference to Henry Kissinger’s successful efforts in the 1970s to pull China away from the Soviet Union and partially ally with the US against it. This diplomatic coup worsened Soviet encirclement and likely contributed to Soviet collapse in the late 1980s.
But there are three major differences between then and now that Trump will struggle to overcome:
China and the Soviet Union Were Already at Odds in the 1970s
The most obvious difference between then and now is that Kissinger and President Richard Nixon were pushing on an open door when they ‘opened China.’
By the late 1960s, China and the USSR were already drifting apart. Ideological differences over Marxism-Leninism overlapped with territorial conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border. Tensions escalated so much that by 1969, the two countries were close to a nuclear conflict.
By contrast, China and Russia today share both ideological and geopolitical goals. Both are nationalist, totalitarian autocracies led by a small, corrupt clique deeply fearful of democratic pressures. And in world politics, they both resent US hegemony and seek to replace it with multipolarity and spheres of influence.
There are tensions in the relationship: Putin is probably more reckless than Chinese leader Xi Jinping would like, and China is more tied to the West – as its primary export market – than Putin would like. But these fissures are not nearly as substantial as those Kissinger exploited.
Is Putin Credible on China?
Almost as challenging for the reverse Kissinger is Putin’s low credibility as a trustworthy partner. The basic outline of the deal is favorable terms for the Russians in Ukraine in the short-term, in exchange for Russian help with China in the medium-term. The sequencing of this bargain favors the Russians. That is, Putin gets the benefits of the deal first, and the US must trust him to deliver his end later.
This is obviously very problematic. Putin is not a trustworthy counterparty. Indeed, the biggest stumbling block in the current peace negotiations over Ukraine is that Europe and Ukraine do not trust Putin to keep to the terms of any deal.
Trump’s reverse Kissinger would need to craft a mechanism to both 1) hold Putin to a peace deal over Ukraine – so that he does not just re-invade again in a few years- and 2) commit Russia to a meaningful, costly anti-Chinese policy for at least a decade. It is not clear how Trump could bind Putin like that.
Opening China did Not have Other US Alliance Costs
The final difference between then and now is that ‘opening Russia’ today would generate alliance strain in a way that opening China then did not.
In the 1970s, US Pacific allies, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, were somewhat nervous about US détente with Red China. But these concerns did not provoke any major breaches or alliance reconfigurations.
By contrast, a Trumpian deal with Russia today – which gave Putin early concrete gains in hopes of later, vague Russian help – would meet a wall of skepticism in the US alliance network. US allies do not trust Putin, and they would likely reject such a deal – including Ukraine, whose cooperation in ending the war is obviously required.
Russian President Vladimir Putin watches a military parade on Victory Day, which marks the 77th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia May 9, 2022. Sputnik/Mikhail Metzel/Pool via REUTERS.
Indeed, these allies would likely break with the US rather than give away Ukraine. In fact, it appears such thinking is already under way.
Breaking NATO for an untrustworthy counterparty (Russia) in search of future gains that counterparty might (probably?) not deliver is a risky proposition. Trump claims mastery of the ‘art of the deal.’ Now is his time to demonstrate that.
About the Author: Dr. Robert E. Kelly
Dr. Robert E. Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. Kelly is also a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor. You can find him on X: @Robert_E_Kelly.
