The U.S. Navy’s next-generation nuclear attack submarine, the SSN(X), has been billed as the future of undersea warfare – stealthier, faster, more lethal, more networked.
Designed to outpace China’s rapid naval expansion and outmatch Russia’s remaining deep-sea menace, SSN(X) is supposed to anchor America’s undersea dominance into the mid-21st century.
But as with every gold-plated program birthed in a Washington echo chamber, it’s worth asking a harder question: is the Navy building the right sub for the right war?
The world has shifted. The Indo-Pacific isn’t what it was in 2005, and neither is the logic of military procurement. In theory, the SSN(X) is being designed to preserve undersea superiority against peer competitors.
But in practice, it’s being developed in a moment when deterrence looks different – and when regional conflicts are dragging the U.S. deeper into theaters where submarines are relevant, but not decisive. Which brings us to the May 2025 flare-up between India and Pakistan and what it tells us about the SSN(X) program.
Let’s state it plainly: the most dangerous nuclear flashpoint in the world right now isn’t the Taiwan Strait or the Baltic. It’s the Line of Control.
While analysts in Washington were still rehashing tired Indo-Pacific tropes about freedom of navigation and “strategic ambiguity,” Pakistan shot down an Indian drone over Kashmir, India retaliated with a limited airstrike on a Pakistani base in Skardu, and Islamabad responded by forward-deploying its Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile force. Meanwhile, Delhi issued a warning that any further escalation would be met with “full-spectrum deterrence.” This is not theoretical. This is nuclear brinkmanship, and it is happening now.
Why does this matter for the SSN(X)? Because the U.S. Navy is on the verge of committing to a submarine program designed for a great-power war that is increasingly unlikely—and ill-suited to respond to the actual conflicts that are flaring up across the multipolar world. Even more provocatively: the next submarine war America gets dragged into may not involve Chinese aircraft carriers or Russian bastion defenses.
It may involve an Indian Ocean crisis sparked by regional nuclear rivals operating on hair triggers and driven by nationalist politics, not classic deterrence logic.
The Navy’s answer? Build a $6-7 billion per unit underwater superweapon optimized for Chinese A2/AD environments—while America is increasingly entangled in second-order crises it can neither control nor decisively influence with platforms like SSN(X). The logic is almost theological: if we build it, we must need it.
Let’s take a step back.
I’ve written before about the tragedy of defense procurement—how Washington designs weapons for the last war, or worse, for imagined wars that conveniently align with budget cycles, defense contractor priorities, and interservice rivalries. The cSSN(X) smells like another chapter in that book. It’s a technological marvel, yes. But like the F-35, it risks becoming a symbol of strategic distraction: too expensive to fail, too exquisite to fight, too disconnected from the actual flashpoints America faces.
And now, with the India-Pakistan crisis heating up, or cooling down, we’re seeing in real time how little relevance the SSN(X) might have in shaping outcomes. In the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal, where American attack submarines might be quietly monitoring Indian and Pakistani movements, the key questions aren’t about stealth, speed, or payload. They’re about escalation control, political leverage, and crisis signaling. A high-end platform optimized for penetrating Chinese defenses in the South China Sea doesn’t help much when Islamabad is trying to prove second-strike credibility and Delhi is signaling with both conventional and nuclear assets.
Pictured is a Kilo-class Russian Submarine in the English Channel. The image was taken from the Royal Navy Wildcat HMA2 Helicopter of 815 Naval Air Squadron. Kilo class is the NATO reporting name for the diesel-electric attack submarine.
In fact, the very presence of U.S. SSNs in these waters might complicate the situation. Neither India nor Pakistan trusts American neutrality in a crisis. Both are keenly aware of the U.S. Navy’s undersea capabilities, and both have learned to interpret those movements as signals. Unlike Cold War-era U.S. adversaries, these regional nuclear powers are not locked into a stable deterrence framework. They are volatile, nationalistic, and deeply sensitive to outside pressure. The presence of next-gen U.S. nuclear attack subs in their backyard may not deter conflict—it may inflame it.
The Pentagon, of course, will argue that the SSN(X) is not built for South Asia—it’s built for China. But that’s exactly the problem. We keep building for China while getting sucked into other conflicts. Ukraine. Red Sea. Now Kashmir. Meanwhile, the defense industrial base is straining. Submarine construction timelines are slipping. Shipyards are at capacity. Skilled labor is short. And we are committing to a program that will cost hundreds of billions over its lifecycle, with questionable strategic payoff.
We don’t have the luxury of Cold War budget surpluses or political consensus anymore. Trump, over 100 days into his second term, may not be an isolationist, but he is a disruptor. He will demand that every dollar be justified. And this time around, with Senate Republicans increasingly skeptical of open-ended procurement sinkholes—and with both Democratic and Republican opposition figures who might have provided adult supervision having lost their seats—there may be no one left to rein in the Navy’s worst instincts.
So here’s a modest proposal: pause the SSN(X). Not cancel, not scrap—just pause. Reassess. Ask the hard questions. Is this platform suited to the strategic environment of the 2030s and 2040s? Will it matter in conflicts that actually erupt, or only in tabletop exercises and Pentagon fantasies? Is there a cheaper, less ambitious alternative that would preserve undersea superiority without bankrupting the fleet?
The Navy’s Submarine Dilemma
Because if we’re honest, the Navy doesn’t need another moonshot platform. It needs more boats. More crew. More shipyard capacity. It needs flexible, deployable, attritable assets that can be where the crises are—not just lurk in the shadows waiting for a great-power war that may never come.
Meanwhile, the India-Pakistan conflict should serve as a wake-up call. Not just about South Asia’s fragility, but about the bankruptcy of our procurement assumptions.
Virginia-Class. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
US Navy Attack Submarine. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Strategic restraint isn’t just a posture—it should shape how we build, where we spend, and how we prepare for a world of crises we didn’t choose, and may not fully understand.
The SSN(X) might yet be part of that future. But unless we rethink it now, it risks becoming a monument to yesterday’s fears—sailing silent and deep while the real world burns in the shallows.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, where he writes a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
