HARGEISA, SOMALILAND—Getting to Somaliland was once easy for diplomats, businessmen, and tourists alike.
It was an easy connection via Ethiopian Airlines or from Fly Dubai, Emirates Airline’s low-cost partner. That changed just over a year ago.
China’s Xi Jinping. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
While the White House celebrated Taiwan’s July 2020 decision to recognize Somaliland, tweeting, “Great to see Taiwan stepping up its engagement in East Africa in a time of such tremendous need. Taiwan is a great partner in health, education, technical assistance, and more!” China was furious. Decades of U.S. diplomatic neglect allowed China to consolidate control over Africa.
Beyond Somaliland, only the small, landlocked country Eswatini maintains relations with Taiwan.
The Chinese embassy in Mogadishu sought an urgent meeting with Somaliland authorities and, according to both Somalilander and Taiwanese officials, promised more than a quarter billion dollars in assistance, but Somaliland held firm.
While the country is impoverished, it is also principled. Both its clan structure and vibrant democratic culture make bribery in Chinese leadership more difficult, since secrecy is harder to maintain.
Shame matters. Exposure of any leader taking bribes would be swift, and such exposure would stigmatize tens of thousands through clan association.
This is why Chinese outreach toward Somaliland’s new president also failed. Bordering both Djibouti and Ethiopia, Somaliland officials also view the two countries as cautionary tales of the dangers of China’s debt-trap diplomacy.
Unable to pry Somaliland away from Taiwan with carrots, China turned toward sticks.
It instigated an insurgency in a far-flung Somaliland province. Beginning in April 2025, China encouraged the Somali government to overturn a 35-year status quo and challenge Somaliland’s airspace.
Without State Department pushback, Mogadishu extended its Air Defense Identification Zone over all of Somaliland, requiring all aircraft to identify themselves for national security.
Beijing demanded, via Mogadishu, denial of overflight and landing rights to aircraft carrying Taiwanese businessmen and development specialists.
The Somali government also instituted an e-visa scheme, requiring anyone entering Somalia or Somaliland to first obtain a Mogadishu-issued e-visa, and subsequently outlawed Taiwanese and Israeli passports.
By October 2025, as Americans, Brits, and Israelis began visiting and investing in Somaliland, China pressured Mogadishu to ban e-visas for all “Non-Somalia-born foreigners.”
Hackers meanwhile accessed Somalia’s e-visa system and stole the data on 35,000 applicants, including their names, addresses, financial information, and photos, posing an immediate risk to both American servicemen and investors, especially given Mogadishu’s ties to China and Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of the Somali security forces.
There are also military implications. With U.S. Africa Command increasingly interested in the Berbera airfield, the State Department’s acceptance of China and Somalia’s expanded Air Defense Identification Zone could undercut American efforts to counter the Houthis or run counter-terror operations in the Horn of Africa.
For Somaliland, there are workarounds: Americans, Israelis, and Taiwanese can fly to Jigjiga, a small town of about 200,000, and then drive the 90-minute-or-so drive to Somaliland’s land border, though concerted pressure on Ethiopia could also endanger this route.
The problem is that what happens in Somaliland does not stay in Somaliland. While the United States and Europe focus on threats to freedom of navigation at sea, China’s relative success in strangling pro-Western Somaliland provides a playbook for elsewhere.
Wedged between South Africa and Mozambique, Eswatini depends entirely on one airport.
Given its neighbors’ pro-China orientation and the State Department’s unwillingness to stand up for Taiwan, Israel, and even Americans in Somaliland, strangling Eswatini is a real threat.
Perhaps the White House, State Department, and Pentagon do not care about such a small African kingdom, but the danger also extends to Latin America.
Paraguay’s importance only grows, given its location and critical mineral wealth. Like Somaliland, Paraguay unapologetically embraces Taiwan and Israel.
Absent any pushback on China’s weaponization of airspace, Beijing could seek to deny flights carrying Americans or Taiwanese into Paraguay’s main Silvio Pettirossi International Airport.
China has become both a master of hijacking and weaponizing international systems and bureaucratic salami slicing: It encroaches on freedoms and operations, pauses to see if there is reaction from the United States and Europe, and then tightens the noose if not.
Today, Somaliland and its airspace are the canary in the coal mine.
If President Donald Trump truly wants to stand up for American businessmen and counter China’s efforts to dominate rare earths, he and Secretary of State Marco Rubio must act to instruct regional states to cease recognizing the Chinese desire for expanded control over airspace in the Horn of Africa before China can take its air denial model farther.
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a distinguished fellow at India’s Usanas Foundation. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin was a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for more than two decades. He has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. Opinions expressed here are the author’s own.
