Key Points and Summary: China’s proximity to Taiwan allows for a rapid military takeover before the U.S. and allies can respond. The Pentagon is countering this with expanded bases in Japan and the Philippines, forward-deployed F-35s, and large-scale joint military exercises like Keen Sword.
-While a surprise Chinese assault could cripple Taiwan’s defenses, U.S. ISR assets and quick-response forces may provide a narrow window to intervene.
A U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit “Stealth” bomber, 393rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., flies over the Pacific Ocean after a recent aerial refueling mission, May 2, 2005. The Bombers are deployed to Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, as part of a rotation that has provided the U.S. Pacific Command a continous bomber presence in the Asian Pacific region since February 2004, enhancing regional security and the U.S. commitment to the Western Pacific. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt. Cecilio Ricardo) (Released)
-The key challenge remains speed—will U.S. forces be able to mobilize fast enough to prevent a full Chinese occupation before Taiwan is overwhelmed?
Taiwan Under Siege? How the Pentagon Plans to Counter China’s Rapid Assault
The Pentagon reports on China have cited what it refers to as a “fait accompli” Chinese threat for years, wherein the People’s Liberation Army (PLAN) uses speed and proximity to quickly annex Taiwan before a United States-allied force can respond.
The concept is clear, as it refers to how the PRC might use proximity and a surprise attack to overwhelm Taiwanese defenses and occupy the island with intense, rapid operations.
Most public reports, published wargames, and expert assessments seem to posit that China would likely fire a salvo of ballistic missiles to blunt, soften, or destroy Taiwanese defenses before launching a coordinated, multi-domain amphibious attack on the island. Speed, surprise, and a mixture of air, surface, and mobile ground forces might seek to take over Taiwan quickly, making it too costly and dangerous for a US-allied force to extricate a large embedded Chinese force with a counterattack.
Thus, a Chinese occupation of Taiwan would become a foregone conclusion, something the US and the West could simply have to accept as a new status quo.
Taiwan: 100 Miles from China
Being merely 100 miles from the SouthEastern Chinese coastline amounts to a tactical scenario wherein the PLA could easily fire short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles at Taiwan and use its force of J-20 stealth aircraft to support from the air.
While only land-launched and potentially challenged to operate extensively throughout a predominantly maritime Pacific, PLA Air Force J-20s could easily reach skies above Taiwan from the mainland.
The Pentagon seems to recognize all of this, as the concept has been discussed for several years in the DoD’s annual Pentagon China report called Military and Security Developments Regarding the People’s Republic of China. This threat scenario is undoubtedly aligned with the Pentagon’s deterrence posture in the Pacific.
This strategy has heavily emphasized forward presence, intensified allied cooperation, and numerous joint, multi-national war preparation exercises throughout the region.
The US has not only been solidifying and increasing military-to-military cooperation and training with Australia, Japan, and The Philippines but formally establishing new bases, adding headquarters, and generating new “structure” and command and control synergy among US-allied forces in the Pacific.
For years, the US has based one of its aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships in Japan.
US Pacific Expansion
In recent months, the US has added new military bases in the Philippines, established a joint US-Japanese headquarters, and intensified surface warfare interoperability between US and Japanese carriers and F-35s. The Pentagon has also moved air assets to Guam and recently based a US Navy Virginia-class submarine there.
Much of this appears clearly aimed at force multiplying kinds of initiatives, yet it also seems focused on pure speed. Simply put, a way to thwart, stop, interrupt, or destroy a surprise Chinese attack on Taiwan is to respond fast and be within striking range.
This is likely why the US focuses so heavily upon forward presence in the Pacific, regularly conducts patrols and war preparation exercises, and maintains a large force in the region. Looking at clear geography, parts of the Southern Japanese islands are roughly 500-miles away from Taiwan, and well-placed carriers, attack submarines and amphibs could help ensure F-35 5th-generation air power operates within reach of skies above Taiwan.
F-15EX Eagle II. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Keen Sword Military Drill
The US and Japan have recently conducted a joint command and control warfighting exercise in the Pacific designed to solidify multi-national interoperability in fire control, ballistic missile defense, and collective forward force presence. Specifically, an exercise called “Keen Sword” used computer simulation to verify the ability of the US and Japan Self Defense Forces to actualize the Pentagon’s “Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control,” according to a significant Lockheed Martin description.
“During this exercise, the Virtualized Aegis Weapon System (VAWS) successfully supported the 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) during a naval special warfare mission to strike a land target. Aegis showcased its flexibility and interoperability by providing and receiving digital fire coordination direction among land and maritime shooters. VAWS eliminated the need for manual operations by transmitting detailed fire control orders digitally, across existing military service databases to include Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System to coordinate simulated fires,” the Lockheed essay explains.
Chengdu J-10 Fighter Jet. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Stopping a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Could these assets mobilize and respond quickly enough to stop a fait accompli? It seems to be the operative question, as the US and its allies would have a distinct advantage in the air, given the size and reach of its 5th-generation air attack.
A Chinese amphibious assault would have little chance of success without an ability to provide air support, and forward-positioned F-35s could potentially “mass” quickly should they be within a few hundred miles. However, the timing and success of a defensive operation would likely rely upon successful air, surface, and space surveillance as such ISR assets could likely see or detect any massive Chinese amphibious assault preparations.
Should US and allied forces in the Pacific observe any large-scale massing of Chinese Air Force and Naval power within quick reach of Taiwan, there might be an opportunity to ensure defensive forces get there fast enough to stop a fait-accompli.
(Aug. 4, 2021) The Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) transits the Strait of Hormuz, Aug. 4, 2021. Iwo Jima is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Logan Kaczmarek)
Such a deterrence posture is not without complexities, given the scope and frequency with which PLA Navy and Air Force units conduct drills, amphibious warfare exercises, and air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. China’s sheer proximity does seem to greatly amplify the threat posed to Taiwan.
About the Author: Kris Osborn
Kris Osborn is the Military Technology Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
