Where will the soldiers come from?
As European leaders pledge to commit tens of thousands of troops to a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, there are serious doubts that European armies have sufficient personnel to accomplish this.
Leclerc Main Battle Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Various numbers have been bandied about. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said that 200,000 troops would be needed. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has proposed a force of 30,000 soldiers from 30 nations, though Starmer has also mentioned 10,000 as a possibility.
In theory, Europe should be able to meet any of these commitments. Europe has around 1.5 million active-duty military personnel (NATO has almost 3.5 million, but that includes non-European states such as the U.S. and Canada). Even given that many of these troops would be retained for duties at home such as training and homeland security, that still leaves a considerable number available for peacekeeping in Ukraine, though far less than Zelensky’s 200,000 figure.
But these numbers mask grim realities. The primary strength of a peacekeeping force in Ukraine would come from European armies. While support from airpower would be essential, it is boots on the ground that would signal that Europe is serious about maintaining Ukraine as an independent nation.
Yet the historically strongest military powers in Europe – that fielded powerful land forces during the World Wars and the Cold War – now have armies that are a fraction of their former glory. The British Army has shrunk to just 73,000 soldiers, its smallest level since the Napoleonic Wars. The French Army is about 118,000-strong, while the German Army – once the most feared in Europe – has just 62,000 soldiers.
There are 27 nations in the EU (not counting Britain, which still has strong links to European defense). Many have small armies, such as Belgium (8,500 soldiers), the Netherlands (15,000) and Norway (4,000).
There is also Poland, with an army of 71,000 and an interest in the security of its neighbor Ukraine. Ironically, the second-largest army in NATO (behind the United States) is Turkey, with a force of 260,000 soldiers.
But Turkey is not a member of the EU, is or is not a part of Europe depending on who you talk to, and has friendly political and trade relations with Russia. While there are reports that Turkey would be willing to send troops to Ukraine (and has sold combat drones to Ukraine that decimated Russian tanks), one question is what Ankara might demand in return, such as membership in the EU.
Europe finds itself in a dilemma. Any peacekeeping force must be strong enough to deter Russia from reinvading Ukraine, or risk becoming a mere speedbump should the Kremlin decide that open warfare with Europe (and probably NATO) is worth the risk.
Yet a permanent ground force in Ukraine would require considerable support as well as enough fresh units and personnel to enable regular rotation.
NATO did manage to muster 60,000 troops for the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia in 1995. But that figure included an American armored division and logistical support, which is unlikely to be repeated under the Trump administration.
The fact is that after years of post-Cold War neglect, many European armies are not in good shape. Britain’s prime mechanized division is barely functional. The Bundeswehr (German armed forces) is plagued by lack of equipment and spare parts. Poland is on an arms-buying spree that might give it the most powerful army in Europe, but new weapons will take time to assimilate.
A serious European effort to protect Ukraine will need ample equipment, spare parts and especially munitions such as artillery shells, guided missiles and drones. European nations, along with the EU, have pledged an $840 billion rearmament plan that will revitalize the continent’s defense-industrial base.
Where the money will come from, and whether social welfare programs will be sacrificed to fund them, remains to be seen.
Ultimately, maintaining a credible peacekeeping force – with actual rather than symbolic military capabilities – may not be possible without at least limited conscription. European militaries – and the U.S. military – are having difficulties in recruiting volunteers.
Many European nations, such as Germany, ended conscription after the Cold War (though formerly neutral NATO members such as Sweden still maintain it).
Will the European public be willing to embrace the draft again? Otherwise, a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine would be just a hollow force.
About the Author: Michael Peck
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
