Is Cuba Next?

Synopsis: Following the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, analysts are questioning whether Cuba will be the next domino to fall.

-The Havana regime faces an existential crisis as the U.S. moves to cut off vital Venezuelan oil and financial aid, exacerbating an economy that has already contracted by 4%.

Air Force Rockwell B-1B Lancer 28th Bomb Wing (28 BW) 37th Bomb Squadron Ellsworth Air Force Base – Rapid City, South Dakota

A B-1B Lancer bomber assigned to the 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., waits to be guided into a parking spot after returning to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, from a bomber task force mission, June 8, 2022. U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Nicholas Priest.

-With Marco Rubio as Secretary of State and the Trump administration viewing the collapse of the Castro legacy as a foreign policy “trophy,” the U.S. is expected to ramp up economic pressure and destabilization efforts against the vulnerable island nation.

A Foreign Policy ‘Trophy’: Why Trump Could Target the Cuban Regime After Seizing Maduro

Is Cuba the next domino to fall?

The seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro continues to roil the region. 

While Maduro’s successor (Vice President Delcy Rodriguez) seems to have asserted power in the short term, the US government has continued to roll out conditions regarding the future of Venezuelan economic and trade policy.

One of those conditions is almost certainly a suspension or serious reduction of aid to the Republic of Cuba.

Since the cessation of Soviet aid in the 1990s (ended by the collapse of the USSR), Havana has relied upon Venezuela for financial support and for cheap energy. 

In return, Cuba has supported the ambitions of the Chavez-Maduro regime both at home and abroad, providing assistance in the economic and security sectors.

Cuban bodyguards protected President Maduro, and numerous Cubans were killed during the attack. 

Cuba in a Bad Way

The Cuban economy is under extraordinary pressure, suffering from aggressive trade and financial sanctions from the Trump administration and decades of economic mismanagement. 

The economy has contracted by 4% over the last year and is facing massive shortages of energy and food. 

Tourism to Cuba suffered mightily during the pandemic and has not recovered, just as additional financial sanctions have straitjacketed Havana’s efforts to access international financial markets.

A B-1B Lancer from the 28th Air Expeditionary Wing (EW), maneuvers to receive fuel while on a bombing mission, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Ending Venezuelan support for Havana will only exacerbate these conditions.

Cuba’s military defenses are trivial. While formidable during the Cold War, Cuba’s military capabilities rapidly atrophied in the 1990s and have not recovered. 

Estimates suggest that Cuba has fewer than two dozen active fighter aircraft, all of which are antiquated. The lack of hard cash and the need to fund domestic priorities shrank Cuba’s arms imports, with no replacement from local industry.

In short, Cuba would pose even less military menace to US intervention than Venezuela. 

Trump on Cuba

Both Trump administrations have been consistently hostile to the Havana government. 

In 2017, Trump reversed President Obama’s relaxation of pressure on Havana by re-establishing vigorous sanctions and travel controls. 

In the current administration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio (of Cuban-American ancestry) has emphasized his hostility to the Havana regime, a holdover from his Senate career. 

Trump’s fixation with domination of the Western hemisphere, along with his focus on immigration and the drug trade, also serves to make Cuba a target. Despite the Republican lean of the Florida Cuban-American community, Trump has imposed additional restrictions on the migration of Cubans to the United States. 

And while Cuba’s role in international narcotics smuggling is relatively trivial and allegations of serious involvement largely specious, Cuban gangs have, of course, participated to some extent in the traffic of illicit drugs to the US. 

A B-2 Spirit assigned to Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., prepares to receive fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker, Feb 7, 2021. A B-2 Spirit performed alongside a B-1B Lancer and a B-52 Stratofortress for the Super Bowl LV flyover on Feb. 7, 2021. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class David D. McLoney)

Cuba is also the kind of problem that appeals to Trump; a glaring eyesore that has been a thorn in the side of the US since the Kennedy administration. 

Trump’s hostility to the norms and practices of diplomatic statecraft means that he is unlikely to rely on the traditional tools that the United States has used to contain Cuba. 

There is little doubt that Trump would consider Havana a premier trophy of foreign policy success, and it is of little surprise that Trump allies are already touting the potential end of the Havana regime. 

The Way Forward

It has hardly been lost on Havana that the same military assets that the US used to grab Nicolas Maduro could be used to grab Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel. Diaz-Canel is not under indictment in the United States, although he and most of his inner circle are subject to an array of travel and financial sanctions.

But it seems more likely the Trump administration will sit back and allow economic pressure on the regime to ramp up while potentially also taking low-visibility steps to destabilize the government and disrupt Cuban society. 

An Italian air force F-35A Lightning II assigned to the 32nd Wing, Amendola Air Base, Italy, taxis while participating in Astral Knight 2021 (AK21) at Aviano Air Base, Italy, May 21, 2021. The aircraft that participated in AK21 include the U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle, HH-60 Pave Hawk and C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, Italian air force F-35 Lightning II aircraft, Hellenic air force F-16 and Emb-145 Erieye aircraft, and Croatian air force MiG-21 BisD/UMD aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Brooke Moeder)

Of course, pressure does not always yield results, and there’s always the chance the Havana regime could successfully buckle down or (alternatively) could collapse in a way that would be destructive to US interests.

Either way, the clock is ticking, and Cuba has few friends to call upon. 

There is no question that Trump would welcome the collapse of the legacy of the Castro government in Cuba, whether or not that collapse is manifested in a Trump Havana Hotel and Casino. Bringing American capital and influence back to Havana, a US goal since the Kennedy administration, would help cement Trump’s legacy in his own mind.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.