The importance of alliances in the Indo-Pacific region has been a consistent theme in US foreign policy, transcending administrations and political divides.
This continuity is evident in the through line from President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) to President Biden’s Indo-Pacific security strategy. The incoming Trump administration must recognize and build upon this foundation as we look toward the future. An “America First” foreign policy will be most effective if it taps into the silk web of US relationships, and US allies will know and respect this.
It is also necessary to recognize the growing relationship of what has been described variously as the Axis of authoritarianism, dictators, chaos, tyranny, or the “Dark Quad.” This is a result of the recognition by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that the US silk web of relationships is immensely powerful.
These Axis players seek to counter and weaken this power while trying to harness their own. But this is a strategic competition that the US can, should, and must win. The US can do so easily when President Trump directs it to happen.
Trump’s 2017 NSS: Laying the Groundwork
The 2017 NSS, crafted during Trump’s first term, emphasized the critical role of US allies in responding to mutual threats and preserving shared interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This document highlighted key partnerships:
– South Korea: Recognizing the alliance’s strength forged through historical trials.
– Japan: Welcomes and supports its strong leadership role.
– Australia: Acknowledging its consistent support in conflicts and shared democratic values.
– New Zealand: Identifying it as a key regional peace and security partner.
– India: Welcoming its emergence as a leading global power and strategic partner.
The NSS also called for increased quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India, known as the Quad.
Biden’s Execution and Expansion
The Biden administration effectively executed and expanded upon the vision outlined in the 2017 NSS. This continuation of policy underscores the bipartisan recognition of the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance. Biden’s approach has further strengthened the “silk web” of friends, partners, and allies aligned with the US around the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The Imperative for Trump’s Return
As Trump returns to office, it is crucial to recognize and build upon the progress rather than dismantle it. The incoming Trump administration should:
Acknowledge Continuity: Recognize that the current state of alliances directly results from the vision laid out in the 2017 NSS.
Take Credit and Build: Claim credit for initiating this strategic direction and commit to further strengthening these relationships.
Review and Adapt: Conduct a thorough review of the 2017 NSS, identifying areas where the Biden administration has made progress and where further work is needed.
Emphasize Shared Goals: Continue to stress the national security requirement for a free and open Indo-Pacific, a concept central to both the Trump and Biden administrations.
Leverage Existing Frameworks: Utilize and enhance structures like the Quad, which have grown from the seeds planted in the 2017 NSS.
Acknowledge Allies’ desire to cooperate with the Trump administration to support mutual interests.
Allies understand Trump and know working with the US is in their best interest. Recognize that alliance bashing is no longer necessary to gain US domestic political support. No friends of the US are afraid of “America First” because it is in their interests to support it. Allies embrace it. They fear an “America Only” concept where they are left out.
The Silk Web of Alliances: A Bipartisan Asset
The network of alliances forged by and reinforced by both Trump and Biden’s leadership represents a “silk web of U.S. friends, partners, and allies” in bilateral, multilateral, and multilateral relationships. This web is a gift for the next administration, offering a robust infrastructure for responding to security and economic challenges. Trump’s next term should embrace this bipartisan achievement, enhancing alliances rather than dismantling or reshaping them unnecessarily.
The Strategic Throughline: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific
A throughline from Trump’s NSS to Biden’s initiatives is the enduring emphasis on a free and open Indo-Pacific. Both administrations recognized the necessity of strategic coalitions to address common threats, from winning in strategic competition versus China and countering its threats to Taiwan and the Philippines and its aggression in the South China Sea to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and its threats to the region and US homeland. Biden’s successes in deepening Quad cooperation and enhancing multilateralism complement Trump’s foundational NSS vision. While each administration had varied tactics and concepts, they have maintained a consistent strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. Effective national security strategy can rarely be effective in one or even two presidential terms.
Former President of the United States Donald Trump speaking with attendees at the 2023 Turning Point Action Conference at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, Florida.
The longer that there is a sustained, consistent strategy, the more effective it can be. President Trump now has an additional term to focus on implementing his original vision and developing a free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
In reclaiming the presidency, Trump should acknowledge and capitalize on the strides made by the Biden administration in the Indo-Pacific that were a result of his vision. By building on the alliance framework and drawing a clear connection to the 2017 NSS, Trump can reinforce the bipartisan commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. This approach not only strengthens US security but also ensures continuity in a region pivotal to global stability.
About the Author: David Maxwell
David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.
