Synopsis: Harrison Kass, a national security analyst and former US Air Force pilot selectee, evaluates the 2009 simulated “kill” of an F-22 Raptor by a US Navy EA-18G Growler.
-Utilizing the AN/ALQ-218 receiver and ALQ-99 jamming pods, the Growler crew successfully exploited the Raptor’s blind spots and emissions profile during a Nellis AFB exercise.
-This 19FortyFive report analyzes the intersection of Electronic Warfare (EW) and stealth doctrine, evaluating how sensor denial and BVR (Beyond-Visual-Range) geometry can bypass 5th-generation defenses, providing a critical lesson for contested Indo-Pacific battlespaces in 2026.
The “Blind Spot” Strategy: Why a 4th-Gen Jamming Jet Once Defeated the F-22 Raptor
The F-22 Raptor is widely regarded as the world’s premier air superiority fighter. Yet in 2009, during an exercise at Nellis AFB, a US Navy EA-18G Growler reportedly scored a simulated AIM-120 “kill” against an F-22. The Growler even sported a Raptor kill marking afterward—an inside-joke badge of honor. But the incident raised serious questions, such as how a fourth-generation electronic jamming aircraft could defeat a fifth-generation air superiority platform in air-to-air combat?
F-22 Raptor Fighter. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Contrasting Jets
The F-22 is a fifth-generation stealth fighter packed with cutting-edge features: thrust-vectoring nozzles, supercruise, advanced AESA radar, sensor fusion, and low observability. It was designed for first-look, first-shot, first-kill performance, optimized for beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements.
The EA-18G, meanwhile, is an electronic warfare variant of the F/A-18F Super Hornet, a two-seater equipped with the AN/ALQ-218 receiver system and ALQ-99 jamming pods. The EA-18G also carries AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.
The platform’s primary mission is the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and electronic attack—it is not designed as a dogfighter. So on paper, this is an epic mismatch in favor of the F-22.
What Happened?
What reports suggest is that the EA-18G pilot maneuvered into the F-22’s “blind spots,” using geometry and awareness, and then locked on with an AIM-120 AMRAAM. This constituted a simulated BVR kill. But it’s important to remember that exercises often include constraints, like limited radar use, specific ROEs, and specific scenario objectives.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor assigned to the 3rd Wing takes off from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Nov 21., 2023. The F-22 Raptor is a critical component of the Global Strike Task Force, and is designed to project dominance rapidly and at a great distance to defeat threats. (U.S. Air Force photo by Alejandro Peña)
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor soars above the United Arab Emirates March 16, 2022. The F-22 Raptors were rapidly deployed on order from the U.S. Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and have joined a range of joint, coalition, and allied and partner combat airpower capabilities already based across the region. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Christopher Ruano)
The F-22’s advantage lies in stealth, radar range, and speed. If those advantages are constrained or situationally degraded, outcomes are likely to shift. And electronic warfare factors can affect outcomes, too, as EQ can complicate radar detection, disrupt sensor pictures, and create uncertainty.
EW Complications
The EA-18’s true power lies not in agility or power but in information warfare. The ALQ-128 detects radar emissions and can geolocate and classify threats. The jamming pod can deny radar lock, create false targets, and reduce detection range.
In a dense electronic environment, situational awareness becomes fluid, stealth advantages can narrow, and network degradation changes engagement geometry. The EA-18G crew likely leveraged radar detection timing, emissions discipline, and team coordination.
Hardly Unique
The EA-18’s “win” was hardly an isolated incident. Fifth-generation jets have been killed before in simulated exercises. Fourth-generation jets like the Rafale, Eurofighter, and F-16 have achieved simulated wins over fifth-generation aircraft.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor conducts a heritage flight during the 2022 Marine Corps Air Station Miramar Air Show at MCAS Miramar, San Diego, California, Sept. 24, 2022. The F-22 Raptor is the Air Force’s fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Its combination of stealth, super-cruise, maneuverability, and integrated avionics, coupled with improved supportability, represents an exponential leap in war-fighting capabilities. The theme for the 2022 MCAS Miramar Air Show, “Marines Fight, Evolve and Win,” reflects the Marine Corps’ ongoing modernization efforts to prepare for future conflicts. (U.S. Air Force photo by Adam Bowles)
But a common thread in each win seems to be constrained scenarios, within-visual-range (WVR) merges, or deliberately disadvantageous setups. While headline-grabbing, these exercises do not equate to operational superiority.
Lessons Learned
Modern air warfare is not about one-on-one dogfights; it rarely comes down to a pure platform comparison. Rather, modern air warfare is about network-centric integration and electronic warfare; it’s about ISR, data links, and information sharing. So, an F-22, despite being more maneuverable, powerful, and stealthy, is not assured of victory; if an F-22 loses sensor dominance, it becomes far less invulnerable—geometry and timing become greater factors.
What the EA-18 G’s victory does not mean is that the EA-18G is superior to the F-22.
Electronic attack aircraft are not stealth fighters. The F-22’s design premise remains intact; the F-22 is still the world’s most dominant air superiority fighter. The kill makes for a good story, boosts Navy morale, and acknowledges tactical skill. But it doesn’t mean anything strategically or doctrinally.
Strategic Implications
The deeper lessons are that electronic warfare is increasingly decisive and that stealth alone is not a force field of invulnerability. Network disruption can equalize advanced platforms. For future conflicts, high-end fights will include heavy jamming, cyber interference, and sensor denial. Platforms must operate in degraded environments.
(Feb. 17, 2009) An EA-18G Growler assigned to the “Vikings” of Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VAQ) 129 aligns itself for an at sea landing aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76). The Growler is the replacement for the EA-6B Prowler, which will be replaced in the 2010 timeframe. Ronald Reagan is underway performing Fleet Replacement Squadron Carrier Qualifications in the Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Torrey W. Lee/Released).
EA-18G Growler. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The EA-18G incident underscores why electronic attack aircraft remain essential, and why every air wing includes dedicated EW assets. The EA-18G is an accomplished EW asset—capable of enabling others and suppressing defenses.
The 2009 EA-18G “kill” remains an interesting footnote. It demonstrates skillful flying, tactical awareness, and EW effectiveness. It does not undermine fifth-generation doctrine. But it reinforces a truth. No aircraft is invincible; electronic warfare and geometry can surprise even the best aircraft.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is an attorney and journalist covering national security, technology, and politics. Previously, he was a political staffer and candidate, and a US Air Force pilot selectee. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in global journalism and international relations from NYU.
