If anything has become crystal clear over the last few days it is that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wants long-term security guarantees from the United States.
Given Ukraine’s geo-strategic location between NATO and Russia, this demand is hardly surprising.
But what would such a security guarantee actually entail? Would it be a kind of backdoor NATO Article 5 commitment, obliging the United States to go to war to protect Ukraine in the event of a future Russian attack ? And if so, is that a risk that is in America’s best interest?
The Security Guarantee Challenge for Ukraine
The language of “security guarantees” is often deliberately equivocal. It can register as anything from a political assurance, to military aid, to explicit pledges to use military force in Ukraine’s defense.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, President Zelensky wants something approximating an Article 5 commitment. But Washington must exercise prudence in this respect. Any security guarantee that the U.S. might be willing to offer needs to be evaluated in light of American national interests, Washington’s long-run strategic priorities, and the limits of U.S. power.
Since at least the end of the Second World War, WAshington’s most robust security commitments have been extended only to treaty partners such as those belonging to NATO, where obligations are explicitly articulated and backed by U.S. military force.
Even Taiwan – of far greater strategic interest for the U.S. – has not been granted such a treaty guarantee, with Washington maintaining a deliberately ambiguous strategic posture toward the island as reflected in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. According to what rationale, then, should Kyiv receive a de facto Article 5 commitment from Washington when it is neither a member of NATO nor party to any other binding treaty relationship with America?
The United States and its European allies have repeatedly insisted that NATO membership for Ukraine is not likely to happen any time soon. The latest developments only confirm this reticence, with Washington continuing to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership – or even to provide some sort of military “backstop” to the recently articulated commitment from France and the United Kingdom to deploy military forces to Ukraine’s to guarantee any negotiated cessation of hostilities. But while these Franco-British promises reflect a growing European willingness on the part of some European countries to support Kyiv, they do not alter the fundamental strategic calculus for the United States.
Specifically, they do not help us address the two fundamental and underlying strategic questions: the first of which is, if Washington offers a security guarantee for Ukraine would that entail an American commitment to fight Russia directly. And the second is, if the answer to the first question is yes, is Ukraine worth it?
Even the most committed proponents of offering a security guarantee to Ukraine must acknowledge that Washinton’s primary strategic concerns lie in the Indo-Pacific, not Eastern Europe. China, not Russia, poses the greatest long-term threat to American interests. A binding security guarantee to Ukraine would be a strategic distraction, draining U.S.military stockpiles, straining its strategic bandwidth, and ultimately undermining America’s ability to blunt and balance China in the Indo-Pacific.
A Promise America Appeares Reluctant to Make to Ukraine
Beyond this, such a guarantee would ensnare the U.S. in a complex geopolitical dynamic. Unlike NATO’s Article 5, which is triggered only in the event of an attack by an external power on a member state, a security guarantee for Ukraine could draw the U.S. into military actions initiated by Kyiv rather than Moscow. If Ukraine decides to launch counteroffensives into Crimea or advance aggressively in the Donbas, would the United States be obliged to support such moves militarily?
Would Washington be committing U.S. troops in support of Ukrainian efforts to recover every inch of territory it claims as its own? These questions demand sound answers, grounded in a prudent understanding of U.S. national interests, before any security guarantee is made.
A more prudent American strategic posture would be to continue providing military assistance without offering binding security guarantees. The U.S. can help Ukraine defend itself without crossing the line into a treaty-like defense obligation. This is the model applied to Taiwan, where the U.S. provides advanced weapons and other kinds of support, but avoids explicit security guarantees. Such an approach would enable Ukraine to resist Russian aggression without tethering Washington to Kyiv’s strategic whims or otherwise limiting U.S. strategic flexibility.
Additionally, Washington should continue to encourage Ukraine’s European neighbors to provide Ukraine with security assistance. Suppose European states – particularly Poland, France, the U.K., and the Baltic nations – want to take on more of the burden of supporting Ukraine’s war efforts and/or guaranteeing a negotiated end to hostilities. In that case, the U.S. should encourage and support them. The burden of defending Ukraine should be shared across the trans-Atlantic community – it should not fall disproportionately on American shoulders.
America Must Communicate Clearly on Ukraine
Security guarantees for Ukraine must not be a backdoor – or a trapdoor – to an American war against Russia. Washington must communicate clearly to all parties what it is and is not willing to do in support of Ukraine. If the U.S. is unwilling to go to war over Ukraine, it must not even suggest otherwise.
Strategic ambiguity, a la Taiwan, is preferable to formal commitment that necessarily involves the possibility of dragging America into another conflict that simply does not serve its core national interests.
In the end, the United States must balance its desire to support Ukraine with the imperative to avoid unnecessary entanglements. America’s global position is not strengthened by overcommitment—it is strengthened by prudent, calculated restraint.
U.S. Air Force Maj. Kristin “BEO” Wolfe, F-35A Lightning II Demonstration Team pilot and commander, flies during the 2021 Reno Air Races, Reno, Nev., Sept. 18, 2021. The 2021 Reno Air Races featured performances from the U.S. Air Force F-35A Demo Team and the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Kip Sumner)
Ukraine deserves support, but not at the cost of American interests – and certainly not at the cost of being drawn into a war that would simply be catastrophic for all involved.
NATO Membership By Any Other Name Is A Mistake
The Trump administration and its successors must think long and hard before making any promises that could, in effect, tie the United States to a future war in Ukraine. If security guarantees mean America must fight to defend Ukraine, then let’s be honest: That is NATO membership and Article 5 in all but name.
And that is a commitment that Washington cannot afford to make – and that Kyiv shouldn’t be asking for.
About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. Andrew is now a Contributing Editor to 19FortyFive, where he writes a daily column. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
